01 July 2018

Politics and the English Language, by George Orwell

I have alluded to, and quoted from, Orwell's opinions on language on several occasions. What follows is a quite lengthy essay on the effects of politics on the Queen's (King's when the essay was written in 1946) English. I highly recommend reading it, for writers to learn how to avoid the errors Orwell points out, and for the general reader to learn the tactics political writers are using to manipulate.

From Orwell.ru

George Orwell

Politics and the English Language

Most people who bother with the matter at all would admit that the English language is in a bad way, but it is generally assumed that we cannot by conscious action do anything about it. Our civilization is decadent and our language — so the argument runs — must inevitably share in the general collapse. It follows that any struggle against the abuse of language is a sentimental archaism, like preferring candles to electric light or hansom cabs to aeroplanes. Underneath this lies the half-conscious belief that language is a natural growth and not an instrument which we shape for our own purposes.

Now, it is clear that the decline of a language must ultimately have political and economic causes: it is not due simply to the bad influence of this or that individual writer. But an effect can become a cause, reinforcing the original cause and producing the same effect in an intensified form, and so on indefinitely. A man may take to drink because he feels himself to be a failure, and then fail all the more completely because he drinks. It is rather the same thing that is happening to the English language. It becomes ugly and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts. The point is that the process is reversible. Modern English, especially written English, is full of bad habits which spread by imitation and which can be avoided if one is willing to take the necessary trouble. If one gets rid of these habits one can think more clearly, and to think clearly is a necessary first step toward political regeneration: so that the fight against bad English is not frivolous and is not the exclusive concern of professional writers. I will come back to this presently, and I hope that by that time the meaning of what I have said here will have become clearer. Meanwhile, here are five specimens of the English language as it is now habitually written.

These five passages have not been picked out because they are especially bad — I could have quoted far worse if I had chosen — but because they illustrate various of the mental vices from which we now suffer. They are a little below the average, but are fairly representative examples. I number them so that I can refer back to them when necessary:
1. I am not, indeed, sure whether it is not true to say that the Milton who once seemed not unlike a seventeenth-century Shelley had not become, out of an experience ever more bitter in each year, more alien [sic]to the founder of that Jesuit sect which nothing could induce him to tolerate.
Professor Harold Laski (Essay in Freedom of Expression)
2. Above all, we cannot play ducks and drakes with a native battery of idioms which prescribes egregious collocations of vocables as the Basic put up with for tolerate, or put at a loss for bewilder.
Professor Lancelot Hogben (Interglossia)
3. On the one side we have the free personality: by definition it is not neurotic, for it has neither conflict nor dream. Its desires, such as they are, are transparent, for they are just what institutional approval keeps in the forefront of consciousness; another institutional pattern would alter their number and intensity; there is little in them that is natural, irreducible, or culturally dangerous. But on the other side, the social bond itself is nothing but the mutual reflection of these self-secure integrities. Recall the definition of love. Is not this the very picture of a small academic? Where is there a place in this hall of mirrors for either personality or fraternity?

Essay on psychology in Politics (New York)
4. All the ‘best people’ from the gentlemen's clubs, and all the frantic fascist captains, united in common hatred of Socialism and bestial horror at the rising tide of the mass revolutionary movement, have turned to acts of provocation, to foul incendiarism, to medieval legends of poisoned wells, to legalize their own destruction of proletarian organizations, and rouse the agitated petty-bourgeoisie to chauvinistic fervor on behalf of the fight against the revolutionary way out of the crisis.

Communist pamphlet
5. If a new spirit is to be infused into this old country, there is one thorny and contentious reform which must be tackled, and that is the humanization and galvanization of the B.B.C. Timidity here will bespeak canker and atrophy of the soul. The heart of Britain may be sound and of strong beat, for instance, but the British lion's roar at present is like that of Bottom in Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream — as gentle as any sucking dove. A virile new Britain cannot continue indefinitely to be traduced in the eyes or rather ears, of the world by the effete languors of Langham Place, brazenly masquerading as ‘standard English’. When the Voice of Britain is heard at nine o'clock, better far and infinitely less ludicrous to hear aitches honestly dropped than the present priggish, inflated, inhibited, school-ma'amish arch braying of blameless bashful mewing maidens!

Letter in Tribune
Each of these passages has faults of its own, but, quite apart from avoidable ugliness, two qualities are common to all of them. The first is staleness of imagery; the other is lack of precision. The writer either has a meaning and cannot express it, or he inadvertently says something else, or he is almost indifferent as to whether his words mean anything or not. This mixture of vagueness and sheer incompetence is the most marked characteristic of modern English prose, and especially of any kind of political writing. As soon as certain topics are raised, the concrete melts into the abstract and no one seems able to think of turns of speech that are not hackneyed: prose consists less and less of words chosen for the sake of their meaning, and more and more of phrases tacked together like the sections of a prefabricated hen-house. I list below, with notes and examples, various of the tricks by means of which the work of prose-construction is habitually dodged.
DYING METAPHORS. A newly invented metaphor assists thought by evoking a visual image, while on the other hand a metaphor which is technically ‘dead’ (e. g. iron resolution) has in effect reverted to being an ordinary word and can generally be used without loss of vividness. But in between these two classes there is a huge dump of worn-out metaphors which have lost all evocative power and are merely used because they save people the trouble of inventing phrases for themselves. Examples are: Ring the changes on, take up the cudgel for, toe the line, ride roughshod over, stand shoulder to shoulder with, play into the hands of, no axe to grind, grist to the mill, fishing in troubled waters, on the order of the day, Achilles’ heel, swan song, hotbed. Many of these are used without knowledge of their meaning (what is a ‘rift’, for instance?), and incompatible metaphors are frequently mixed, a sure sign that the writer is not interested in what he is saying. Some metaphors now current have been twisted out of their original meaning without those who use them even being aware of the fact. For example, toe the line is sometimes written as tow the line. Another example is the hammer and the anvil, now always used with the implication that the anvil gets the worst of it. In real life it is always the anvil that breaks the hammer, never the other way about: a writer who stopped to think what he was saying would avoid perverting the original phrase.
OPERATORS OR VERBAL FALSE LIMBS. These save the trouble of picking out appropriate verbs and nouns, and at the same time pad each sentence with extra syllables which give it an appearance of symmetry. Characteristic phrases are render inoperative, militate against, make contact with, be subjected to, give rise to, give grounds for, have the effect of, play a leading part (role) in, make itself felt, take effect, exhibit a tendency to, serve the purpose of, etc., etc. The keynote is the elimination of simple verbs. Instead of being a single word, such as break, stop, spoil, mend, kill, a verb becomes a phrase, made up of a noun or adjective tacked on to some general-purpose verb such as prove, serve, form, play, render. In addition, the passive voice is wherever possible used in preference to the active, and noun constructions are used instead of gerunds (by examination of instead of by examining). The range of verbs is further cut down by means of the -ize and de- formations, and the banal statements are given an appearance of profundity by means of the not un- formation. Simple conjunctions and prepositions are replaced by such phrases as with respect to, having regard to, the fact that, by dint of, in view of, in the interests of, on the hypothesis that; and the ends of sentences are saved by anticlimax by such resounding commonplaces as greatly to be desired, cannot be left out of account, a development to be expected in the near future, deserving of serious consideration, brought to a satisfactory conclusion, and so on and so forth.
PRETENTIOUS DICTION. Words like phenomenon, element, individual (as noun), objective, categorical, effective, virtual, basic, primary, promote, constitute, exhibit, exploit, utilize, eliminate, liquidate, are used to dress up a simple statement and give an air of scientific impartiality to biased judgements. Adjectives like epoch-making, epic, historic, unforgettable, triumphant, age-old, inevitable, inexorable, veritable, are used to dignify the sordid process of international politics, while writing that aims at glorifying war usually takes on an archaic colour, its characteristic words being: realm, throne, chariot, mailed fist, trident, sword, shield, buckler, banner, jackboot, clarion. Foreign words and expressions such as cul de sac, ancien regime, deus ex machina, mutatis mutandis, status quo, gleichschaltung, weltanschauung, are used to give an air of culture and elegance. Except for the useful abbreviations i. e., e. g. and etc., there is no real need for any of the hundreds of foreign phrases now current in the English language. Bad writers, and especially scientific, political, and sociological writers, are nearly always haunted by the notion that Latin or Greek words are grander than Saxon ones, and unnecessary words like expedite, ameliorate, predict, extraneous, deracinated, clandestine, subaqueous, and hundreds of others constantly gain ground from their Anglo-Saxon numbers(1). The jargon peculiar to Marxist writing (hyena, hangman, cannibal, petty bourgeois, these gentry, lackey, flunkey, mad dog, White Guard, etc.) consists largely of words translated from Russian, German, or French; but the normal way of coining a new word is to use Latin or Greek root with the appropriate affix and, where necessary, the size formation. It is often easier to make up words of this kind (deregionalize, impermissible, extramarital, non-fragmentary and so forth) than to think up the English words that will cover one's meaning. The result, in general, is an increase in slovenliness and vagueness.
MEANINGLESS WORDS. In certain kinds of writing, particularly in art criticism and literary criticism, it is normal to come across long passages which are almost completely lacking in meaning(2). Words like romantic, plastic, values, human, dead, sentimental, natural, vitality, as used in art criticism, are strictly meaningless, in the sense that they not only do not point to any discoverable object, but are hardly ever expected to do so by the reader. When one critic writes, ‘The outstanding feature of Mr. X's work is its living quality’, while another writes, ‘The immediately striking thing about Mr. X's work is its peculiar deadness’, the reader accepts this as a simple difference opinion. If words like black and white were involved, instead of the jargon words dead and living, he would see at once that language was being used in an improper way. Many political words are similarly abused. The word Fascism has now no meaning except in so far as it signifies ‘something not desirable’. The words democracy, socialism, freedom, patriotic, realistic, justice have each of them several different meanings which cannot be reconciled with one another. In the case of a word like democracy, not only is there no agreed definition, but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides. It is almost universally felt that when we call a country democratic we are praising it: consequently the defenders of every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they might have to stop using that word if it were tied down to any one meaning. Words of this kind are often used in a consciously dishonest way. That is, the person who uses them has his own private definition, but allows his hearer to think he means something quite different. Statements like Marshal Petain was a true patriot, The Soviet press is the freest in the world, The Catholic Church is opposed to persecution, are almost always made with intent to deceive. Other words used in variable meanings, in most cases more or less dishonestly, are: class, totalitarian, science, progressive, reactionary, bourgeois, equality.
Now that I have made this catalogue of swindles and perversions, let me give another example of the kind of writing that they lead to. This time it must of its nature be an imaginary one. I am going to translate a passage of good English into modern English of the worst sort. Here is a well-known verse from Ecclesiastes:
I returned and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all.
Here it is in modern English:
Objective considerations of contemporary phenomena compel the conclusion that success or failure in competitive activities exhibits no tendency to be commensurate with innate capacity, but that a considerable element of the unpredictable must invariably be taken into account.
This is a parody, but not a very gross one. Exhibit (3) above, for instance, contains several patches of the same kind of English. It will be seen that I have not made a full translation. The beginning and ending of the sentence follow the original meaning fairly closely, but in the middle the concrete illustrations — race, battle, bread — dissolve into the vague phrases ‘success or failure in competitive activities’. This had to be so, because no modern writer of the kind I am discussing — no one capable of using phrases like ‘objective considerations of contemporary phenomena’ — would ever tabulate his thoughts in that precise and detailed way. The whole tendency of modern prose is away from concreteness. Now analyze these two sentences a little more closely. The first contains forty-nine words but only sixty syllables, and all its words are those of everyday life. The second contains thirty-eight words of ninety syllables: eighteen of those words are from Latin roots, and one from Greek. The first sentence contains six vivid images, and only one phrase (‘time and chance’) that could be called vague. The second contains not a single fresh, arresting phrase, and in spite of its ninety syllables it gives only a shortened version of the meaning contained in the first. Yet without a doubt it is the second kind of sentence that is gaining ground in modern English. I do not want to exaggerate. This kind of writing is not yet universal, and outcrops of simplicity will occur here and there in the worst-written page. Still, if you or I were told to write a few lines on the uncertainty of human fortunes, we should probably come much nearer to my imaginary sentence than to the one from Ecclesiastes.

As I have tried to show, modern writing at its worst does not consist in picking out words for the sake of their meaning and inventing images in order to make the meaning clearer. It consists in gumming together long strips of words which have already been set in order by someone else, and making the results presentable by sheer humbug. The attraction of this way of writing is that it is easy. It is easier — even quicker, once you have the habit — to say In my opinion it is not an unjustifiable assumption that than to say I think. If you use ready-made phrases, you not only don't have to hunt about for the words; you also don't have to bother with the rhythms of your sentences since these phrases are generally so arranged as to be more or less euphonious. When you are composing in a hurry — when you are dictating to a stenographer, for instance, or making a public speech — it is natural to fall into a pretentious, Latinized style. Tags like a consideration which we should do well to bear in mind or a conclusion to which all of us would readily assent will save many a sentence from coming down with a bump. By using stale metaphors, similes, and idioms, you save much mental effort, at the cost of leaving your meaning vague, not only for your reader but for yourself. This is the significance of mixed metaphors. The sole aim of a metaphor is to call up a visual image. When these images clash — as in The Fascist octopus has sung its swan song, the jackboot is thrown into the melting pot — it can be taken as certain that the writer is not seeing a mental image of the objects he is naming; in other words he is not really thinking. Look again at the examples I gave at the beginning of this essay. Professor Laski (1) uses five negatives in fifty three words. One of these is superfluous, making nonsense of the whole passage, and in addition there is the slip — alien for akin — making further nonsense, and several avoidable pieces of clumsiness which increase the general vagueness. Professor Hogben (2) plays ducks and drakes with a battery which is able to write prescriptions, and, while disapproving of the everyday phrase put up with, is unwilling to look egregious up in the dictionary and see what it means; (3), if one takes an uncharitable attitude towards it, is simply meaningless: probably one could work out its intended meaning by reading the whole of the article in which it occurs. In (4), the writer knows more or less what he wants to say, but an accumulation of stale phrases chokes him like tea leaves blocking a sink. In (5), words and meaning have almost parted company. People who write in this manner usually have a general emotional meaning — they dislike one thing and want to express solidarity with another — but they are not interested in the detail of what they are saying. A scrupulous writer, in every sentence that he writes, will ask himself at least four questions, thus: What am I trying to say? What words will express it? What image or idiom will make it clearer? Is this image fresh enough to have an effect? And he will probably ask himself two more: Could I put it more shortly? Have I said anything that is avoidably ugly? But you are not obliged to go to all this trouble. You can shirk it by simply throwing your mind open and letting the ready-made phrases come crowding in. The will construct your sentences for you — even think your thoughts for you, to a certain extent — and at need they will perform the important service of partially concealing your meaning even from yourself. It is at this point that the special connection between politics and the debasement of language becomes clear.

In our time it is broadly true that political writing is bad writing. Where it is not true, it will generally be found that the writer is some kind of rebel, expressing his private opinions and not a ‘party line’. Orthodoxy, of whatever colour, seems to demand a lifeless, imitative style. The political dialects to be found in pamphlets, leading articles, manifestos, White papers and the speeches of undersecretaries do, of course, vary from party to party, but they are all alike in that one almost never finds in them a fresh, vivid, homemade turn of speech. When one watches some tired hack on the platform mechanically repeating the familiar phrases — bestial, atrocities, iron heel, bloodstained tyranny, free peoples of the world, stand shoulder to shoulder — one often has a curious feeling that one is not watching a live human being but some kind of dummy: a feeling which suddenly becomes stronger at moments when the light catches the speaker's spectacles and turns them into blank discs which seem to have no eyes behind them. And this is not altogether fanciful. A speaker who uses that kind of phraseology has gone some distance toward turning himself into a machine. The appropriate noises are coming out of his larynx, but his brain is not involved, as it would be if he were choosing his words for himself. If the speech he is making is one that he is accustomed to make over and over again, he may be almost unconscious of what he is saying, as one is when one utters the responses in church. And this reduced state of consciousness, if not indispensable, is at any rate favourable to political conformity.

In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the professed aims of the political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called transfer of population or rectification of frontiers. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called elimination of unreliable elements. Such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them. Consider for instance some comfortable English professor defending Russian totalitarianism. He cannot say outright, ‘I believe in killing off your opponents when you can get good results by doing so’. Probably, therefore, he will say something like this:
‘While freely conceding that the Soviet regime exhibits certain features which the humanitarian may be inclined to deplore, we must, I think, agree that a certain curtailment of the right to political opposition is an unavoidable concomitant of transitional periods, and that the rigors which the Russian people have been called upon to undergo have been amply justified in the sphere of concrete achievement.’
The inflated style itself is a kind of euphemism. A mass of Latin words falls upon the facts like soft snow, blurring the outline and covering up all the details. The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one's real and one's declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish spurting out ink. In our age there is no such thing as ‘keeping out of politics’. All issues are political issues, and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred, and schizophrenia. When the general atmosphere is bad, language must suffer. I should expect to find — this is a guess which I have not sufficient knowledge to verify — that the German, Russian and Italian languages have all deteriorated in the last ten or fifteen years, as a result of dictatorship.

But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought. A bad usage can spread by tradition and imitation even among people who should and do know better. The debased language that I have been discussing is in some ways very convenient. Phrases like a not unjustifiable assumption, leaves much to be desired, would serve no good purpose, a consideration which we should do well to bear in mind, are a continuous temptation, a packet of aspirins always at one's elbow. Look back through this essay, and for certain you will find that I have again and again committed the very faults I am protesting against. By this morning's post I have received a pamphlet dealing with conditions in Germany. The author tells me that he ‘felt impelled’ to write it. I open it at random, and here is almost the first sentence I see: ‘[The Allies] have an opportunity not only of achieving a radical transformation of Germany's social and political structure in such a way as to avoid a nationalistic reaction in Germany itself, but at the same time of laying the foundations of a co-operative and unified Europe.’ You see, he ‘feels impelled’ to write — feels, presumably, that he has something new to say — and yet his words, like cavalry horses answering the bugle, group themselves automatically into the familiar dreary pattern. This invasion of one's mind by ready-made phrases (lay the foundations, achieve a radical transformation) can only be prevented if one is constantly on guard against them, and every such phrase anaesthetizes a portion of one's brain.

I said earlier that the decadence of our language is probably curable. Those who deny this would argue, if they produced an argument at all, that language merely reflects existing social conditions, and that we cannot influence its development by any direct tinkering with words and constructions. So far as the general tone or spirit of a language goes, this may be true, but it is not true in detail. Silly words and expressions have often disappeared, not through any evolutionary process but owing to the conscious action of a minority. Two recent examples were explore every avenueand leave no stone unturned, which were killed by the jeers of a few journalists. There is a long list of flyblown metaphors which could similarly be got rid of if enough people would interest themselves in the job; and it should also be possible to laugh the not un- formation out of existence(3), to reduce the amount of Latin and Greek in the average sentence, to drive out foreign phrases and strayed scientific words, and, in general, to make pretentiousness unfashionable. But all these are minor points. The defence of the English language implies more than this, and perhaps it is best to start by saying what it does not imply.

To begin with it has nothing to do with archaism, with the salvaging of obsolete words and turns of speech, or with the setting up of a ‘standard English’ which must never be departed from. On the contrary, it is especially concerned with the scrapping of every word or idiom which has outworn its usefulness. It has nothing to do with correct grammar and syntax, which are of no importance so long as one makes one's meaning clear, or with the avoidance of Americanisms, or with having what is called a ‘good prose style’. On the other hand, it is not concerned with fake simplicity and the attempt to make written English colloquial. Nor does it even imply in every case preferring the Saxon word to the Latin one, though it does imply using the fewest and shortest words that will cover one's meaning. What is above all needed is to let the meaning choose the word, and not the other way around. In prose, the worst thing one can do with words is surrender to them. When you think of a concrete object, you think wordlessly, and then, if you want to describe the thing you have been visualising you probably hunt about until you find the exact words that seem to fit it. When you think of something abstract you are more inclined to use words from the start, and unless you make a conscious effort to prevent it, the existing dialect will come rushing in and do the job for you, at the expense of blurring or even changing your meaning. Probably it is better to put off using words as long as possible and get one's meaning as clear as one can through pictures and sensations. Afterward one can choose — not simply accept — the phrases that will best cover the meaning, and then switch round and decide what impressions one's words are likely to make on another person. This last effort of the mind cuts out all stale or mixed images, all prefabricated phrases, needless repetitions, and humbug and vagueness generally. But one can often be in doubt about the effect of a word or a phrase, and one needs rules that one can rely on when instinct fails. I think the following rules will cover most cases:
i. Never use a metaphor, simile, or other figure of speech which you are used to seeing in print.

ii. Never use a long word where a short one will do.

iii. If it is possible to cut a word out, always cut it out.

iv. Never use the passive where you can use the active.

v. Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word, or a jargon word if you can think of an everyday English equivalent.

vi. Break any of these rules sooner than say anything outright barbarous.
These rules sound elementary, and so they are, but they demand a deep change of attitude in anyone who has grown used to writing in the style now fashionable. One could keep all of them and still write bad English, but one could not write the kind of stuff that I quoted in those five specimens at the beginning of this article.

I have not here been considering the literary use of language, but merely language as an instrument for expressing and not for concealing or preventing thought. Stuart Chase and others have come near to claiming that all abstract words are meaningless, and have used this as a pretext for advocating a kind of political quietism. Since you don't know what Fascism is, how can you struggle against Fascism? One need not swallow such absurdities as this, but one ought to recognise that the present political chaos is connected with the decay of language, and that one can probably bring about some improvement by starting at the verbal end. If you simplify your English, you are freed from the worst follies of orthodoxy. You cannot speak any of the necessary dialects, and when you make a stupid remark its stupidity will be obvious, even to yourself. Political language — and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists — is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind. One cannot change this all in a moment, but one can at least change one's own habits, and from time to time one can even, if one jeers loudly enough, send some worn-out and useless phrase — some jackboot, Achilles’ heel, hotbed, melting pot, acid test, veritable inferno, or other lump of verbal refuse — into the dustbin where it belongs.
1946
_____
THE END

Are Faithful Catholics Allowed to Question the Liturgical Reform?—A Dialogue

Dr  takes on those who claim that the Novus Ordo Missae of Pope Paul VI is untouchable, that it cannot be criticised because it was validly promulgated by the Pope.

Almost in the manner of a scholastic disputatio he destroys the arguments one by one.

From One Peter Five


William: My good fellow, I simply can’t go along with your position that the Novus Ordo is inherently defective. A pope could never promulgate a liturgy that was harmful to the faithful.
Terence: Bill, you amaze me! What prevents you from seeing what seems an obvious fact to me and so many other Catholics? Of course a pope can do that, because Paul VI did it in spades, and here we are, wallowing in the mess. The mess is all around us, in the countless boring and banal, if not irreverent and sacrilegious liturgies celebrated every day.
William: That’s only because of the way people have chosen to celebrate it, Terry. There’s nothing wrong with the liturgy in itself—nor could there be. Blame the driver, don’t blame the car!
Terence: Let’s try to step back. Your hesitations proceed, if I’m not mistaken, from an underlying anxiety about what the fallout would be, if one admitted that it had been a mistake for Paul VI to promulgate a new Order of Mass (and a new order of everything he could get his hands on). What would happen to the life or duties of Catholics if one believed that the new liturgy was a deviation, a dead end; that the traditional liturgy preceding it was fundamentally sound and already capable of meeting the needs of ‘modern man’; and that one ought to embrace it again, as much as one could?
William: Yes, quite so. Now that you say it, I believe that the fallout would be considerable. I don’t think we could trust the pope with anything, if we can’t trust him with the liturgy. It might undermine the whole system of Catholic belief and practice.
Terence: It may surprise you to hear that I can’t see any significant fallout for me. Thinking as I do about the liturgical reform, I still profess the Creed and accept all the defined dogmas and morals clearly taught by the Church. I strive to pattern my life after the lives of Our Lord, His Mother, and the long line of saints. I receive and pass on the teaching contained in the authoritative catechisms. I worship God within the apostolic tradition that the Church has handed down in its integrity, as the primary source of her sanctity. Really, the only difference between me and a Catholic of a century ago is that it was easier for him to have access to these things, whereas I must seek them out with determination, in the teeth of the ignorance, error, hostility, and indifference of clergy and laity alike.
William: That’s rather strongly put, but I suppose it makes you not very much different from a sincere Catholic of the Reformation period, living amidst ecclesiastical corruption and doctrinal confusion, working hard to know your faith and live according to it.
Terence: Exactly. Does this mean that I am on a trajectory towards repudiating the office of the papacy or its ultimate authority to define or adjudicate matters of faith or morals? Far from it.
William: Then how do you make sense out of the enormous lapse in papal prudence demanded by your position? Wouldn’t it undermine the reverence we owe the pope, and the confidence we place in him?
Terence: Here we get to the nub of the question. The papal office does not in principleexclude grievous flaws in the prudential order and in matters of non-definitive teaching. Such flaws may include the imprudent approval of a liturgical or sacramental rite defective in its secondary elements (that is, not in its form and matter), which are liable to occasion an inadequate or faulty understanding of the mysteries with which it deals. Scripture, Tradition, and Magisterium have never told us that this is impossible; it is not ruled out by the doctrine of papal infallibility as defined by Vatican I; therefore it is possible.
William: I would need to study Vatican I more carefully to assess your claim.
Terence: In addition to what the Magisterium itself says about its own conditions and limitations, we are also supposed to take seriously the evidence of our reason, our senses, our wits. God is the author of nature as much as He is the author of the supernatural. When we can see a disaster, we are to accept it as a disaster, and react accordingly.
William: I will stick with my usual line: if a layman or cleric comes away from the new liturgy with a misunderstanding about faith or morals, it is his own fault, since it was not required of him that he misunderstand anything—as would occur with an explicitly heretical liturgy like that of the Calvinists.
Terence: That’s not convincing, because the competent authority has a duty to provide such aids to understanding as human nature requires, and to avoid, as much as possible, anything that might readily suggest a false understanding. If vast numbers misunderstand what they have been given, there is a problem in the thing that was given, and the blame for this problem falls squarely on the one who gave it.
William: Be patient with me, as I’m still learning about the ins and outs of this debate. Could you offer some examples?
Terence: The Novus Ordo removes traditional aids to understanding and worshiping rightly—this, after all, is what orthodoxy means: right doctrine and right worship, inseparably—and includes antiquarian or novel elements that suggest a false understanding of the Mass—for example, anachronistically returning to ancient Eucharistic practices that, coming after the development of medieval piety whose effects extended right into the modern world, had and could only have had a modernist inflection and the result of a weakening of faith in the Real Presence. Moreover, the dubious or explicitly modernist opinions of the new liturgy’s compilers are well documented, which establishes that the very ones who put it together intended to remove certain aids and introduce certain novelties.
William: That’s pretty damning, if it’s true.
Terence: It’s well documented by the very people who revised the liturgy in the sixties and seventies.
William: All right, you’ll have to show me some of those sources later. But let’s assume you are right about what the reformers intended to do. How does this implicate the pope?
Terence: Can we get away with saying that a pope who patronizes such a product—a product of questionable theories, suspicious innovations, and manifest departures from the general consensus of the Council Fathers as documented in Sacrosanctum Concilium—and then promulgates it for the Church of the Latin Rite is not, in a real sense, responsible for the deleterious effects that this new liturgy has had on the faithful? Can we say that he is not, in any way, answerable for its defects?
William: I don’t see how we could.
Terence: Both natural reason and the judgment of faith would resoundingly answer No. This pope, Montini by name, is responsible for the evil of rupture; he is answerable for each and every one of the numberless abuses of the rite he promulgated, because in the manner of its redaction as well as in the manner of its very existence and operation, it departs from the sure path of tradition and opens the way to false inculturation, pluralism without end, and celebratory individualism, egoism, and narcissism.
William: I’m uncomfortable with where you’re going, but it’s hard for me to deny it. The pope is responsible for what he promulgates—and if its flaws are built in, so to speak, then he is as much their author as Bugnini or any other member of the Consilium. Or rather, he is even more their author, because he formally adopts the work as his own when he puts it forward authoritatively under his name.
Terence: You’ve got it.
William: But why are you so sure that the results of the reform have been uniformly bad?
Terence: I don’t need to say all bad; just mostly bad. Can anyone seriously doubt that the new liturgy has had the most deleterious effects since its coercive introduction almost half a century ago? Quite apart from the statistics about rapid and devastating declines in Mass attendance throughout the Catholic world (a trend that began in the first fervor of liturgical experimentation in the 1960s and continues to this day, as the relentless closing of churches reminds us), there has been massive confusion about what the Mass is, and whether the Lord is truly present in the Eucharist, and how the priest at the altar differs from the layman, and other basics (basics!) of the Catholic Faith—even among those Catholics who still attend Mass and who are polled with simple questions that a first communion candidate in the 1950s could have answered with ease. Above all, one dare not ask Catholics whether the Mass is a sacrifice. Almost the only ones who will answer “yes” and could offer a simple explanation of their answer are Catholics who attend Mass with the Ecclesia Dei communities, the SSPX, and those few dozen parishes worldwide that have a sound liturgical life.
William: Surely, many if not most of these problems take us back to wayward implementation, bad preaching, and the lack of good Catholic schools?
Terence: You are conveniently sidestepping the fact that the new Mass itself was everywhere perceived as inviting and even requiring a tradition-lite, improvisatory instantiation with storytelling preaching, and that nothing substantive was ever done to prevent this from happening.
William: But there have been so many Vatican documents…
Terence: Oh, don’t start on that! The endless stream of toothless documents, a mountain of inefficacious verbiage, is a sad testimony to the utter failure of genuine pastoral governance—ironic in an age that has adopted the word “pastoral” for its special descriptor. If there was a genuine desire to restore sacrality, reverence, beauty, solemnity, seriousness, good music, and so forth to the liturgy, it would all have come long ago. It has not and never will, because the Novus Ordo isn’t fundamentally, inflexibly, dogmatically committed to the traditional vision of worship, and neither are the popes or bishops who support it.
William: So you think that the Novus Ordo is doomed to fail—that it cannot be turned right?
Terence: There’s no reason to beat around the bush: the simple act of jettisoning the inherited liturgy, which was beloved across the ages and across the globe, and the imposition of a massively different neo-liturgy on a body of faithful that was not asking for such a change, more than adequately explains why it was not blessed by God with the fruitfulness characteristic of the one true Church or the universal acceptance expected for a papal act.
William: Say more what you mean.
Terence: Its bad fruits were immediately apparent, and its lack of acceptance by certain members of the laity and clergy was a poignant sign that something had gone seriously wrong—a sign that has not diminished but grown in the subsequent decades, down to the present. Except in places that had a longstanding rite of their own and held on to it through thick and thin, the Tridentine liturgy was accepted throughout the Catholic world with ever-increasing unanimity. In stark contrast, the new rite of Paul VI generated controversy from the start. It was called into question and resisted by a not inconsiderable number of Catholics, both famous and obscure, in different parts of the world, and never won over everyone for whom it was intended. Each year that passes, more Catholics around the world effectively reject this botched reform in its totality, as they seek to return to the blessings of traditional worship. There has never been anything like it in Church history. That should tell us something about the limits of anyone’s ability—be he the undisputed ruler of the known world, or the plenipotent pope of Rome—to dictate to reality how it must be!
William: You are evidently not of the opinion of certain bloggers who think that traditionalism is a short-lived flash-in-the-pan, destined to go the way of Amish irrelevance…
Terence: Leaving aside the fascinating question of how irrelevant the Amish actually are when compared with the last gasps of mainline Protestantism, yes, I don’t share those excessively optimistic views. Despite the vain wishes of its fabricators, the Novus Ordo Missae is never going to be able to establish itself as the only form of the Roman Rite. Communities centered around the traditional Mass are yielding a disproportionately large harvest of priestly and religious vocations,[1] arising from their consistently larger and better-catechized families.
William: You have to admit, though, that Pope Francis and his supporters around the world are doing their level best to stamp out the traditionalists.
Terence: When traditional Catholics are persecuted, as they have been during this pontificate, they do not give up or go away. If the blood of martyrs is the seed of Christianity, something analogous is true of the thrusting aside of traditionalists, which only increases their intense work and prayer for the true reform of the Church, and confirms their assessment of the fundamentally modernist orientation of their enemies, which is not hard to prove in any case.
William: Don’t you think there is a danger of traditionalists developing a martyr complex, and thinking themselves better or more right just because they are in trouble?
Terence: The fact that traditionalists are seen and treated as worse than all other heretics or schismatics because they believe and pass on what every Catholic used to believe for centuries is a glowing sign that they are on the right path, the narrow path that leads to renewal. Renewal always comes from absolute conviction, from total commitment to the truth of divine revelation in the Church. If we look at reform movements, we can see that this is always the work of a few, not of the many. The many are too comfortable in their positions of power or their assumptions about “the way things are.” The few see things differently, envision something better. It is a privilege to suffer as a Catholic from the assaults of Catholics; it is a privilege to suffer for Jesus Christ and the Faith of our fathers instead of giving way to the ersatz peddled by the old boys’ club.
William: We seem to have gone rather far afield from our original question. Do you mind if I come back to it?
Terence: Not at all.
William: Here is what I am committed to saying at all costs. The pope, when promulgating a liturgy, cannot promulgate a sacramentally invalid liturgy or one that contains positive error in faith or morals.
Terence: That’s all your position boils down to? Then there’s no disagreement between us.
William: You have to say more, Terry. Don’t leave me hanging.
Terence: I don’t know whether to call it a matter of faith or a conclusion deducible from a matter of faith, but I am convinced—and I believe that traditionalists in general would agree—that the pope cannot promulgate an invalid liturgy or one that contains positive error in faith or morals. Unpacked, this claim means that any papally-promulgated sacramental rite will contain at least the form and matter required for the completion of that sacrament, and that one would not be able to establish that it expressly denies any article of faith or asserts claims that could only be construed as heretical.
William: So far, so good.
Terence: It does not follow, however, that the whole content of the Catholic Faith would have to be found in a papally-promulgated rite. There is no reason it could not give a gravely inadequate expression to certain doctrines, or contain ambiguities susceptible to heretical interpretation. On the contrary, a valid rite could be defective in expressing the dogmatic and moral content of the Faith, and superficial or ambiguous enough to make heretical interpretation not only possible but probable. It could, in addition, allow or prompt a lack of due devotion, deficient reverence, and even sacrilege.
William: Once again, examples would help. What kind of defects are you referring to?
Terence: One example would be the deliberate omission[2] throughout the Novus Ordo of 1 Corinthians 11:27–29, where unworthy Eucharistic communion is sternly warned against. This is no minor point of doctrine, given that both Scripture and the liturgy connect unworthy reception with the soul’s eternal damnation!
William: I see your point, and concede it.
Terence: Some ultramontanists claim far more than you and I are claiming. For instance, they say that a papally promulgated liturgy is necessarily well-ordered; that it necessarily promotes the good of the Church as a whole; that it is incapable of having deleterious effects on the body of the faithful due to omissions, ambiguities, additions, or other modifications. I’m sorry to have to puncture their pretty balloons, but there is absolutely no way to prove such claims, quite apart from the difficulty of sustaining them in the face of mountains of contrary evidence. Claims of this nature are absurdly overstated and make a mockery of the Catholic doctrine of the papacy itself.
William: Let me summarize, to make sure I understand. The Catholic traditionalist does not assert that the Novus Ordo Missae embodies positive error in faith and morals. He does claim, however, that it is not in continuity with the tradition of the Roman Rite, and that this discontinuity has had catastrophic effects on the actual life of the Church. The practice of the faith has in fact declined due to what was done to the liturgy, and orthodox belief and morals have in fact suffered due to the omissions, ambiguities, modifications, and tolerated abuses of the new liturgy.
Terence: You have summed it up perfectly.
William: All the same, Terry, I still feel you’re being unfair to the Novus Ordo. You assume that it will be done in a flawed manner—which, admittedly, it often is. In argumentation, however, we should assume the Novus Ordo as Paul VI promulgated and intended it.
Terence: It is completely artificial to talk about some pristine Novus Ordo that measures all others, like the standard meter bar fashioned in the French Enlightenment. If one is hoping to find the new liturgy celebrated in full observance of the General Instruction of the Roman Missal and according to a Ratzingerian hermeneutic of continuity—that is, in Latin for the unchanging parts (as called for by Vatican II), with Gregorian chant (as called for by Vatican II), ad orientem (as the very rubrics of the Ordo Missae presuppose[3]), without lay ministers of holy communion, and so forth—one might as well plan on making a pilgrimage to the Oratory in London, Oxford, or Toronto. You won’t find this rare bird in your neighborhood aviary.
William: But surely this is how it is supposed to be?
Terence: That, my friend, is where you are mistaken. If Paul VI gave the Church something definite, then we can take up your proposal. If he gave us something designedly malleable, subject to inculturation, adaptation, and variation, the almost countless abuses of which are tolerated everywhere, can we even talk about whether “the new liturgy” is a good thing or a bad thing? What are we even talking about? The very fact that it is so indefinite, indeterminate, and intractable is an unanswerable strike against it—a sign either that something is wrong with the form as such or that the hierarchy (including the popes) have been guilty of grave dereliction in their responsibility of watching over the liturgy and ensuring that the faithful have access to it in its integral fullness. Either way, the buck stops there, at the shoes, red or black, of the fisherman.
William: We are talking about what Paul VI himself had in mind and intended.
Terence: Unless you’re a mind reader of extraordinary facility, good luck with Montini’s mind, which seems to have changed depending on the last person who spoke with him. Moreover, are we seriously going to say that it makes no difference what kind of modernist theology the compilers of the Novus Ordo had—as if, once Paul VI promulgated it, all the erroneous assumptions behind it evaporated and the result was suddenly healed, in a kind of papal miracle? As if the removal of the Septuagesima season, contrary to ancient tradition and human psychology, doesn’t matter at all, because once Paul VI promulgated the denuded calendar of 1969, it must be the faithful’sfault if they don’t get out of the streamlined new calendar everything their predecessors got out of the old one?
William: You are always putting so much emphasis on externals.
Terence: Do the aesthetics, the outward signs, of worship[4] have no impact on subjective belief? Or are we going to say, again and again, that any failure on the part of the faithful to get what they should out of the Mass is exclusively their own fault—not the fault of a liturgy stripped of precisely those semiotic elements and ascetical practices that transmitted and reinforced moral and dogmatic truths?
William: Fair enough.
Terence: In a further ventilation of this entrancing logic, we would also have to argue that the cessation from works of penance of the majority of Catholic faithful, in spite of Our Lord’s first words being “Do penance and believe in the Gospel,” has nothing to dowith the removal of mandatory Friday abstinence and daily Lenten fasting; it’s just the fault of the lazy faithful, who should have hit upon creative penances instead of following what their forefathers had done for centuries.
William: One would have to be an idiot to think so, I’m afraid.
Terence: When all is said and done, the Novus Ordo’s hyperultramontanist defenders sound increasingly naĂŻve, threadbare, unconvincing, disconnected from reality. Their arguments in defense of a monumental rupture are an insult to the God who created reason and elevated it by His grace, who fashioned our Catholic liturgy over the ages by the breath of His Spirit, who placed on our shoulders the sweet yoke of obedience to His commandments and the light burden of submission to His Providence.
William: I hope you’re not including me among these defenders!
Terence: No, you have a great deal of common sense, which has served you well in these horrid times.
William: What do you think Catholics ought to do, then?
Terence: For God’s sake (truly), let us put aside forced apologetics for the liturgical reform, frankly see it for the stupendous disaster it was, and seek our healing in a return to venerable rites hallowed by centuries of faith and devotion. As a matter of fact, these rites never perished, and today they are taking root in more and more places, as true nourishment for a flock reprehensibly neglected.
William: And what are the implications for the pope? After all, it was the papacy that started this whole conversation…
Terence: When Jesus said solemnly to Peter: “Feed my sheep … feed my lambs,” He was asking him to take that task upon himself. He was not stating “You will feed my sheep and lambs,” as if he would automatically do it, whether he wanted to or not! Every pope—indeed, every spiritual shepherd—subsequently has to give ear to Our Lord and freely choose to follow Him, lovingly feeding the sheep and lambs purchased by His Precious Blood. May our shepherds awaken, if they have not already done so, to the urgent need to restore to full honor and magnificence the traditional worship of the Church, which should never have been despised and set aside.
William: Whatever differences remain between us, Terry, we definitely agree on that.

NOTES:

A Misunderstanding About Method

An essay by GKC himself.

From the ChesterBelloc Mandate



[Note: There is no 48th proposition in Book II of Euclid. This is a trick question which would stump someone without even basic training, but which is obvious to the initiate: that is the meaning of the, which is "the proposition that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal to each other". It is interesting to know that the 48th proposition of the book is the converse of the 47th – the famous Pythagorean Theorem.] The ancient Guild of Bridge-Builders will have to build many such bridges.

Now from comments that have come my way, I gather that the suggestions I have already made may not altogether explain their own place and purpose in this scheme. I am merely pointing out that monopoly is not omnipotent even now and here; and that anybody could think, on the spur of the moment, of many ways in which its final triumph can be delayed and perhaps defeated. Suppose a monopolist who is my mortal enemy endeavours to ruin me by preventing me from selling eggs to my neighbors, I can tell him I shall live on my own turnips in my own kitchen-garden. I do not mean to tie myself to turnips; or swear never to touch my own potatoes or beans. I mean the turnips as an example: something to throw at him. Suppose the wicked millionaire in question comes and grins over my garden wall and says, "I perceive by your starved and emaciated appearance that you are in immediate need of a few shillings; but you can't possibly get them," I may possibly be stung into retorting, "Yes, I can. I could sell my first edition of ." I do not necessarily mean that I see myself already in a pauper's grave unless I can sell ; I do not mean that I have nothing else to suggest except selling ; I do not mean to brag like any common politician that I have nailed my colours to the policy. I mean to tell the offensive pessimist that I am not at the end of my resources; that I can sell a book or even, if the case grows desperate, write a book. I could do a great many things before I came to definitely anti-social action like robbing a bank or (worse still) working in a bank. I could do a great many things of a great many kinds, and I give an example at the start to suggest that there are many more of them, not that there are no more of them. There are a great many things of a great many kinds in my house, besides the copy of . Not many of them are of great value except to me; but some of them are of some value to anybody. For the whole point of a home is that it is a hotch-potch. And mine, at any rate, rises to that austere domestic ideal. The whole point of one's own house is that it is not only a number of totally different things, which are nevertheless one thing, but it is one in which we still value even the things that we forget. If a man has burnt my house to a heap of ashes, I am none the less justly indignant with him for having burnt everything, because I cannot at first even remember everything he has burnt. And as it is with the household gods, so it is with the whole of that household religion, or what remains of it, to offer resistance to the destructive discipline of industrial capitalism. In a simpler society, I should rush out of the ruins, calling for help on the Commune or the King, and crying out, "Haro! a robber has burnt my house." I might, of course, rush down the street crying in one passionate breath, "Haro! a robber has burnt my front door of seasoned oak with the usual fittings, fourteen window frames, nine curtains, five and a half carpets, 753 books, of which four were , one portrait of my great-grandmother," and so on through all the items; but something would be lost of the fierce and simple feudal cry. And in the same way I could have begun this outline with an inventory of all the alterations I should like to see in the laws, with the object of establishing some economic justice in England. But I doubt whether the reader would have had any better idea of what I was ultimately driving at; and it would not have been the approach by which I propose at present to drive. I shall have occasion later to go into some slight detail about these things; but the cases I give are merely illustrations of my first general thesis: that we are not even at the moment doing everything that could be done to resist the rush of monopoly; and that when people talk as if nothing could now be done, that statement is false at the start; and that all sorts of answers to it will immediately occur to the mind.

Capitalism is breaking up; and in one sense we do not pretend to be sorry it is breaking up. Indeed, we might put our own point pretty correctly by saying that we would help it to break up; but we do not want it merely to break down. But the first fact to realize is precisely that; that it is a choice between its breaking up and its breaking down. It is a choice between its being voluntarily resolved into its real component parts, each taking back its own, and its merely collapsing on our heads in a crash or confusion of all its component parts, which some call communism and some call chaos. The former is the one thing all sensible people should try to procure. The latter is the one thing that all sensible people should try to prevent. That is why they are often classed together.

I have mainly confined myself to answering what I have always found to be the first question, "What are we to do now?" To that I answer, "What we must do now is to stop the other people from doing what they are doing now." The initiative is with the enemy. It is he who is already doing things, and will have done them long before we can begin to do anything, since he has the money, the machinery, the rather mechanical majority, and other things which we have first to gain and then to use. He has nearly completed a monopolist conquest, but not quite; and he can still be hampered and halted. The world has woken up very late, but that is not our fault. That is the fault of all the fools who told us for twenty years that there could never be any Trusts; and are now telling us, equally wisely, that there can never be anything else.

There are other things I ask the reader to bear in mind. The first is that this outline is only an outline, though one that can hardly avoid some curves and loops. I do not profess to dispose of all the obstacles that might arise in this question, because so many of them would seem to many to be quite a different question. I will give one example of what I mean. What would the critical reader have thought, if at the very beginning of this sketch I had gone off into a long disputation about the Law of Libel? Yet, if I were strictly practical, I should find that one of the most practical obstacles. It is the present ridiculous position that monopoly is not resisted as a social force but can still be resented as a legal imputation. If you try to stop a man cornering milk, the first thing that happens will be a smashing libel action for calling it a corner. It is manifestly mere common sense that if the thing is not a sin it is not a slander. As things stand, there is no punishment for the man who does it; but there is a punishment for the man who discovers it. I do not deal here (though I am quite prepared to deal elsewhere) with all these detailed difficulties which a society as now constituted would raise against such a society as we want to constitute. If it were constituted on the principles I suggest, those details would be dealt with on those principles as they arose. For instance, it would put an end to the nonsense whereby men, who are more powerful than emperors, pretend to be private tradesmen suffering from private malice; it will assert that those who are in practice public men must be criticized as potential public evils. It would destroy the absurdity by which an "important case" is tried by a "special jury"; or, in other words, that any serious issue between rich and poor is tried by the rich. But the reader will see that I cannot here rule out all the ten thousand things that might trip us up; I must assume that a people ready to take the larger risks would also take the smaller ones.

Now this outline is an outline; in other words, it is a design, and anybody who thinks we can have practical things without theoretical designs can go and quarrel with the nearest engineer or architect for drawing thin lines on thin paper. But there is another and more special sense in which my suggestion is an outline; in the sense that it is deliberately drawn as a large limitation within which there are many varieties. I have long been acquainted, and not a little amused, with the sort of practical man who will certainly say that I generalize because there is no practical plan. The truth is that I generalize because there are so many practical plans. I myself know four or five schemes that have been drawn up, more or less drastically, for the diffusion of capital. The most cautious, from a capitalist standpoint, is the gradual extension of profit-sharing. A more stringently democratic form of the same thing is the management of every business (if it be a small business) by a guild or group clubbing their contributions and dividing their results. Some Distributists dislike the idea of the workman having shares only where he has work; they think he would be more independent if his little capital were invested elsewhere; but they all agree that he ought to have the capital to invest. Others continue to call themselves Distibutists because they would give every citizen a dividend out of much larger national systems of production. I deliberately draw out my general principles so as to cover as many as possible of these alternative business schemes. But I object to being told that I am covering so many because I know there are none. If I tell a man he is too luxurious and extravagant, and that he ought to economize in something, I am not bound to give him a list of his luxuries. The point is that he will be all the better for cutting down any of his luxuries. And my point is that modern society would be all the better for cutting up property by any of these processes. This does not mean that I have not my own favourite form; personally I prefer the second type of division given in the above list of examples. But my main business is to point out that any reversal of the rush to concentrate property will be an improvement on the present state of things. If I tell a man his house is burning down in Putney, he may thank me even if I do not give him a list of all the vehicles which go to Putney, with the numbers of all the taxicabs and the time-table of all the trams. It is enough that I know there are a great many vehicles for him to choose from, before he is reduced to the proverbial adventure of going to Putney on a pig. It is enough that any one of those vehicles is on the whole less uncomfortable than a house on fire or even a heap of ashes. I admit I might be called unpractical if impenetrable forests and destructive floods lay between here and Putney; it might then be as merely idealistic to praise Putney as to praise Paradise. But I do not admit that I am unpractical because I know there are half a dozen practical ways which are more practical than the present state of things. But it does not follow, in fact, that I do not know how to get to Putney. Here, for instance, are half a dozen things which would help the process of Distributism, apart from those on which I shall have occasion to touch as points of principle. Not all Distributists would agree with all of them; but all would agree that they are in the direction of Distributism. (1) The taxation of contracts so as to discourage the sale of small property to big proprietors and encourage the break-up of big property among small proprietors. (2) Something like the Napoleonic testamentary law and the destruction of primogeniture. (3) The establishment of free law for the poor, so that small property could always be defended against great. (4) The deliberate protection of certain experiments in small property, if necessary by tariffs and even local tariffs. (5) Subsidies to foster the starting of such experiments. (6) A league of voluntary dedication, and any number of other things of the same kind. But I have inserted this chapter here in order to explain that this is a sketch of the first principles of Distributism and not of the last details, about which even Distributists might dispute. In such a statement, examples are given as examples, and not as exact and exhaustive lists of all the cases covered by the rule. If this elementary principle of exposition be not understood, I must be content to be called an unpractical person by that sort of practical man. And indeed in his sense there is something in his accusation. Whether or no I am a practical man, I am not what is called a practical politician, which means a professional politician. I can claim no part in the glory of having brought our country to its present promising and hopeful condition. Harder heads than mine have established the present prosperity of coal. Men of action, of a more rugged energy, have brought us to the comfortable condition of living on our capital. I have had no part in the great industrial revolution which has increased the beauties of nature and reconciled the classes of society; nor must the too enthusiastic reader think of thanking me for this more enlightened England, in which the employee is living on a dole from the State and the employer on an overdraft at the Bank.

Carmelite SOS: “Cor orans is the Death-Knell of Carmelite Monasticism”

I have been a Tertiary of the Order of Our Lady of Mount Carmel for over 30 years. The Discalced Sisters are part of the Family of Carmel. I ask your prayers for them, as Francis and his minions attempt to destroy them.

Vatican II encouraged the Orders to return to their original documents. These Sisters have, and now Rome is intent on forcing them to deny not only the charism of their Order, but the decrees of Vatican II on the Religious Life.


From What's Up With Francischurch?



St. Teresa of Avila, pray for us in this hour of darkness.


I have been contacted by a community of Carmelites who have seen the document, and are desperate to try to warn the remaining faithful Carmels of the Teresian reform.

Today’s piece for the Remnant contains some of their remarks:

Today I received an email from a monastery of cloistered Carmelite nuns about the new document from the Vatican’s Congregation for Religious. They’re helping me examine this document, having kindly volunteered to serve as consultants, to help me understand it from an inside position. These, I might add, are not what we would consider a “traditionalist” community. They have only the Novus Ordo Mass and use the new rite Divine Office in their native vernacular language. For obvious reasons I can’t identify them, even to say what country they are in.

Writing to me in English, by way of introductory comments in their longer analysis of the document that will be forthcoming, Sister T, fully professed and a senior member of the monastery’s council, said, “The Cor Orans document is the death-knell of Carmel. It signals the end of the contemplative monastic life. Not only does it destroy the autonomy of the Monasteries, something Our Holy Mother St. Teresa was extremely insistent about, but it also removes the Superior, dissolves her authority and power, removes the financial independence of each Monastery, and destroys the specificity of each charism.

“This is a disaster. Especially for Carmel.”

Feasts of July. Part 1


IN LUMINE FIDEI: JULY – THE MONTH OF THE MOST PRECIOUS BLOOD

IN LUMINE FIDEI: JULY – THE MONTH OF THE MOST PRECIOUS BLOOD: Like devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, devotion to His Precious Blood is one of the oldest forms of Catholic piety, and over the ...

IN LUMINE FIDEI: 1 JULY – THE MOST PRECIOUS BLOOD

IN LUMINE FIDEI: 1 JULY – THE MOST PRECIOUS BLOOD: O Blood of my crucified Jesus, dwell in my soul to purify it. O Blood of my crucified Jesus, dwell in my heart to inflame it. ...

1 July, A Chesterton Calendar

JULY 1st

The average man votes below himself; he votes with half a mind or a hundredth part of one. A man ought to vote with the whole of himself, as he worships or gets married. A man ought to vote with his head and heart, his soul and stomach, his eye for faces and his ear for music; also (when sufficiently provoked) with his hands and feet. If he has ever seen a fine sunset, the crimson colour of it should creep into his vote. If he has ever heard splendid songs, they should be in his ears when he makes the mystical cross. But as it is, the difficulty with English democracy at all elections is that it is something less than itself. The question is not so much whether only a minority of the electorate votes. The point is that only a minority of the voter votes.

‘Tremendous Trifles.’

Chesterton, G. K.. The G. K. Chesterton Collection [50 Books] (Kindle Locations 44479-44485). Catholic Way Publishing. Kindle Edition.

2 July, The Roman Martyrology

ante diem vi Nonas Julias

July 2nd anno Domini 2018 The 19th Day of the Moon, were born into the better life: 

At Rome, upon the Aurelian Way, the holy martyrs Processus and Martinian, who were baptized by the blessed Apostle Peter in the Mamertine Prison, and crowned with martyrdom under Nero by being slain with the sword, after suffering the beating of their mouths, the rack, thongs, cudgels, fire, and loaded whips. 
At Rome also, the three holy soldiers who turned to Christ at the martyrdom of the blessed Apostle Paul, and thus earned a share with him in the glory of heaven. 
On the same day, the holy martyrs Ariston, Crescentian, Eutychian, Urban, Vitalis, Justus, Felicissimus, Felix, Marcia, and Symphorosa, who were all crowned with martyrdom in the Campania while the persecution was raging under the Emperor Diocletian. 
At Winchester, in England, the holy Swithin, Bishop of that city, [in the year 863,] whose holiness shone forth in the grace of working miracles, and whose feast day we keep upon the 15th day of this present month of July. [His head was taken to the cathedral of Évreux at the end of the fourteenth century.] 
At Bamberg, [in Bavaria,] holy Otho, Bishop of [that see,] who preached the Gospel to the Pomeranians, and turned them to the faith, [in the year 1139.] 
At Tours, the holy woman Monegund, [about the year 573] 
V. And elsewhere many other holy martyrs, confessors, and holy virgins.
R. Thanks be to God.

Memes of the Day



“I am not myself very much concerned with the question of influence, or with those publicists who have impressed their names upon the public by catching the morning tide and rowing very fast in the direction in which the current was flowing; but rather that there should always be a few writers preoccupied in penetrating to the core of the matter, in trying to arrive at the truth and to set it forth, without too much hope, without ambition to alter the immediate course of affairs, and without being downcast or defeated when nothing appears to ensue.” 
— T.S. Eliot