A Dominican Canonist Responds to the Responsa ad Dubia

A carefully nuanced analysis of the Responsa ad dubia by a trained Canonist and Professor of Canon Law in the Pontifical Faculty of the Immaculate Conception (Dominican House of Studies) in Washington, DC.

From Edward Pentin

By Fr Pius Pietrzyk, OP, STL, JD, JCD

Initial Comment

I do not come to these questions without my own experiences of the liturgy and the way it has shaped my own faith. Like many young people, in college in the early 90s, I drifted away from the practice of the faith. I always would have considered myself Catholic but was becoming a functional atheist. In law school, I came back to the practice of the faith in large part because a friend encouraged me to attend the “Traditional Latin Mass” in our city. Having grown up after the reforms of the Council, I had never experienced the earlier form. So, with my mother’s childhood hand missal in hand, I went. It changed me profoundly.

Although somewhat mystifying initially, it gave me for the first time a deep love for the liturgical life. My regular attendance at the old Mass increased both my understanding of the Sacrament and my appreciation for the reformed rites of the Vatican II Liturgy. Much of the reason for this was the parish, which insisted on the union of the liturgical rites. At this parish it was not only the “TLM” that was offered, but also the reformed rites, in both English and Latin. The priests were clear and insistent that these were equal in dignity because they each made present the same Christ and the same sacrifice. The parish was a Vatican II parish in that it embraced and taught the documents of the Council, regardless of the form of the liturgy. The parish was, of course, St. John Cantius in Chicago.

When I began attending Mass at St. John Cantius, I remember thinking how strange it was that Cardinal Bernardin (who was still alive when I first moved to Chicago), himself no traditionalist, would approve the older Mass. And he did not approve it with a variety of restrictions, as was common in those days, but gave the pastor wide discretion to celebrate the older form. As I came to understand, Cardinal Bernardin believed in making available to his people any lawful spiritual or liturgical form that might help their faith. While he personally did not find greater spiritual nourishment from the older forms, he understood that some of his flock did. And he believed that as their pastor it was his job to feed the flock not just with the food he liked, but with whatever would truly nourish them. While there were many things Cardinal Bernardin did that I did not agree with, this pastoral attitude I have tried to keep as a priest. I would not be a priest today but for Cardinal Bernardin’s pastoral solicitude in giving broad permission for the use of the older form of the Mass. I learned from his example that being a priest doesn’t mean I get to impose my preferences on the people of God, but that I have the duty to provide from the fullness of the Church’s spiritual treasure what they need to grow in holiness.

I also want to make clear at the outset that the Holy Father has the right and authority to regulate the liturgy in the universal Church. One may legitimately question the prudence or spiritual effectiveness of actions to curtail the use of the older liturgical forms, but the Church’s perennial teaching has never questioned the Holy Father’s authority over such matters, and nor do I. As the Second Vatican Council made clear in Sancrosanctum Concilium (no. 22): “Regulation of the sacred liturgy depends solely on the authority of the Church, that is, on the Apostolic See and, as laws may determine, on the bishop.”

Of course, the head of a Curial Department is not the same as the Supreme Pontiff. As the Prefect of a Congregation, Archbishop Roche exercises vicarious power, which flows from the Supreme Pontiff, and therefore relies on the strictures of law for its authority. The Prefect of a dicastery does not exercise legislative power. That is, he does not establish new, universally binding law. Rather, he exercises authority according to laws established by the Supreme Pontiff. As a result, the scope of his authority relies on the parameters of that established law. He cannot of his own accord increase the ambit of his authority.

I also want to state that I believe that Pope Francis and Archbishop Roche are doing what they believe to be in the best interest of the common good of the Church. The Christian Faithful, of course, have the right to express respectfully their disagreement or criticisms of the manner by which they pursue that good. However, to impugn the character of the Pontiff or the Prefect by ascribing to them evil motives or intentions runs contrary to the duty of all Catholics to maintain communion with the Church’s legitimate hierarchy. Catholics have a right and at times even the duty to manifest their opinions on matters that pertain to the good of the Church (can. 212 §3), but that right carries with it the corresponding obligation to manifest those opinions with reverence toward their pastors and always seeking to maintain communion with the Church (can. 209 §1).

The opinions expressed below are based on my experience and training in law. They are not intended to be, and I pray they not be, interpreted as an ad hominem attack on any official of the Church. As one engaged in the sacred discipline of ecclesiastical law, they are an expression of my prudent opinion on those areas of the common good where I have some expertise (can. 218). In this, as in all things, to the extent that any of my statements are contrary to that legitimate authority of the Church, I freely submit to her authentic magisterium.

What is your overall impression of the Responsa ad dubia? What is its purpose in your view?

First, it is important to consider the legal force of these Responsa ad dubia in general. In that, the CDWDS itself has publicly stated its expectation. In 1969, it indicated that the Responsa ad dubia published in its official journal Notitiae were to be treated this way: “Solutiones quae proponuntur non induunt vestem officialem, sed habent valorem orientativum: solutiones ‘ex officio’ publici iuris fient in Acta Apostolicae Sedis” (Notitiae 5 (1969) p. 323). That is, these private responses were understood as having no official value unless they were published in the official record of the Church. This approach was put in somewhat different terms by the same Congregation in 1997, when it said: “Licet solutiones quae proponuntur potestatem legislativam non habeant, induunt tamen vestem officialem quia actuale magisterium et praxim huius Congregationis exprimunt” (Notitiae 34 (1997) p. 138). That is, the CDWDS has said explicitly that its Responsa ad dubia have no legislative force. They merely express the thinking and practice of the Congregation on a particular legal issue. Therefore, unlike the motu proprio Traditionis custodes, these Responsa have no legal force in se.

That does not however mean they have no value. The mind of the Curia should be considered and evaluated according to the experience and knowledge of the dicastery. Legally speaking, they are an important source to consider when dealing with lacunae in the law (see can. 19). In other words, the Responsa ad dubia do not establish new law or expand the reach of existing law but are meant to assist ordinaries in the application of law when express provisions are lacking. However, where the law itself expressly addresses an issue, an Ordinary must follow the express provisions of the law, especially where these Reponsa diverge from the law.

Another important consideration for all Responsa ad dubia is that they must be understood in reference to the law that they seek to explicate. The primary law in this matter is the Apostolic Letter issued motu proprio by Pope Benedict XVI in 2007, Summorum Pontificum, and the official instruction Ecclesiae universae issued by the Commission Ecclesia Dei in 2011.

One of the central issues in any new law is the extent to which prior law remains viable. When I first read Traditionis custodes, I concluded that these prior documents remained largely in force, and only lacked force where they conflicted with the provisions of the new motu proprio. The Responsa ad dubia seems to suggest otherwise, and I admit I do not entirely understand the reason or the extent of the abrogation, but that does seem to be its conclusion.

It might be helpful to explain why I drew the conclusion I did. It is a fundamental maxim of legal interpretation in the canonical system that we presume later laws do not abrogate prior laws but should be interpreted to harmonize them (can. 21). In legal language, when later law intends to revoke a prior law it does so through an “abrogation” or “derogation” clause. Abrogation clauses imply a total revocation, derogation clauses imply a partial one. Often, when later law intends to withdraw specific provisions of earlier law, such revoked provisions are expressly mentioned in the abrogation clause (see, e.g., CIC can. 6, Quareit semper, art. 1). Also, when a new law intends to abrogate all prior law on a given subject, it says so directly (see, e.g., Divinus perfectionis Magister). Much more common than abrogation clauses are more generic derogation clause. These specify the Legislator’s intent that the new law takes priority over earlier law, but only to the extent such earlier laws are contrary to it.

How should we read the “abrogation” clause from TC?  On the one hand, the clause in TC uses the word “abrogate”, suggesting a more complete revocation, but on the other hand it includes the qualifier that it applies only to non-conforming provisions (“che risultino non conformi”). That is, the clause in TC has aspects of both abrogation and derogation, and it is not readily apparent which is meant.

Furthermore, the clause itself cannot be understood as an abrogation clause according to the full literal meaning of the text. This is because such a broad interpretation would lead to clearly erroneous conclusions. The “abrogation” clause of TC is not self-limiting. One must look to other parts of the motu proprio to understand its scope. That scope is located in Article 1, which states, “The liturgical books promulgated by Saint Paul VI and Saint John Paul II, in conformity with the decrees of Vatican Council II, are the unique expression of the lex orandi of the Roman Rite.”  In other words, by a strictly literal reading of the abrogation clause the effect of the motu proprio is to remove all permission for any liturgical books in the Roman Rite other than the 1962 Missale Romanum and those liturgical books promulgated by Pope Paul VI or John Paul II. Such an interpretation would sweep up a variety of liturgical books that seem beyond its intended scope, but clearly within that literal reading. For example, the current 1990 Messale Ambrosiano was promulgated not by the Supreme Pontiff but by the Archbishop of Milan. There is also the question of the religious orders. For example, the Order of Preachers issued a revised Missale in 1965, responding to the calls for reform from 1962’s Sacrosanctum Concilium. Within limits, permission for the use of that missal has remained in force since 1965. However, while the Missale was given approbation by the Holy See, it was promulgated under the authority of the Master of the Order of Preachers. Similarly, the revised Missale Cartusiense was issued by the Carthusian Order itself in 1981. More recently, of course, the missal of the Anglican Ordinariate was approved under Pope Benedict XV, but under the authority of the Ordinariate itself. That is, given the “text and context” (can. 17), interpreting the clause as a total revocation seems clearly erroneous, and therefore only a partial revocation (derogation) is intended.

In addition, the Holy Father seems to have made somewhat contrasting statements on the matter. In the letter accompanying TC he asserts that he took “the firm decision to abrogate all the norms, instructions, permissions and customs that precede the present Motu proprio”. Of course, this is not the language of the motu proprio itself and does not precisely track it. In contrast, he subsequently expressed in an interview his intention to “support and consolidate Summorum Pontificum”, indicating that those norms were otherwise still in force.

As can. 21 makes, clear, the law presumes that later law does not invalidate prior law unless is does so expressly. When there is doubt about whether a provision has been abrogated or derogated from, the preference of law is to harmonize them into a cohesive whole, rather than assume one is revoked.  Therefore, given the presumptions of the law, the language of the derogation clause in TC, and the Pope’s own expressed words, the best legal interpretation seems to be that those other documents remain in force and are abrogated, but only to the extent that they conflict with the express provisions of TC. It is true that the Responsa ad dubia seems to suggest otherwise, but that document is not legislative in nature and therefore no power in se to abrogate these earlier documents.

Some have said the document has gross canonical errors. What are your views on the following canonical questions?: In relation to the first Responsum (when it is not possible to find a church, oratory or chapel for the old Mass, the bishop must ask the Congregation for Divine Worship for a dispensation to allow celebration in a parish church), canonists have cited Canon 87 invoking the bishops’ power to dispense from Traditionis Custodes, judging that it would be in the spiritual good of the faithful. What is your view on this?

I do not think I would use the word “gross”, but the document does not seem to evince a full understanding of canonical norms. This is not limited to the CDWDS. The Italian canonist Geraldine Boni recently wrote a book examining the value of the expertise of the juridical sciences and the use of the legal experts in the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts (PCLT) by the various dicasteries. (Geraldina Boni, La recente attività normativa ecclesiale: finis terrae per lo ius canonicum? Per una valorizzazione del ruolo del Pontificio Consiglio per i testi legislativi e della scienza giuridica nella Chiesa (Modena 2021)) What she reveals is a worrying lack of involvement by the experts at the PCLT in advising the other Roman dicasteries in developing legal texts, which had previously been standard practice. It does seem that these Responsa ad dubia are indicia of this same wider trend among the curial offices in Rome.

I would agree that the Responsa seem to take insufficient account of the power of the local bishops to dispense from universal law. In the 1967 Synod of Bishops, the question of the reform of the Code of Canon Law was taken up. Using this synodal process, the Bishops developed a list of 10 items that they wanted to guide the reform of the law. The fourth item on that list was: “Bishops are to have the authority to dispense from the general laws of the church.”  This is what eventually became can. 87. The Responsa ad dubia do not seem to sufficiently take into account the importance of this canon in the reform of the Code. This was not just about legal power, but about carrying out the will of the Second Vatican Council is understanding the proper ecclesiology of the Church and the role of the diocesan bishop. While there has always been some debate among canonists as to whether the canon extended to liturgical law, most canonists have long believed it does. The Responsa ad dubia seems to merely dismiss this central point of ecclesiology without the consideration it deserves. I would point especially to the recent statement on the issue by Bishop Thomas Paprocki, one of the most highly regarded canonists in the Church, and which was issued before the publication of these Responsa ad dubia.

The stipulation not to advertise the TLM in the parish schedule is said to break with Canon 18 as TC does not say this, and the canon stipulates that restrictive laws are to be interpreted strictly. Would you agree with this?

As I noted above, I do not believe these responsa have the force of law in se. This is an expression of the mind of the CDWDS on how it believes ordinaries should approach the law. Bishops and pastors are free, both legally and morally, to arrive at another conclusion, after due consideration of the mind of the Congregation, and considering the pastoral circumstances in their local communities.

Response no. 3 is said to be an attempt to force concelebration, which would be against Canon 902 (“priests are fully entitled to celebrate the Eucharist individually”). Would you agree with this?

The Responsa does seem to lack a sufficient understanding on the legal and ecclesiological norms of concelebration. Like the question of episcopal dispensations, this is not simply a legal norm but was a part of the teaching of the Second Vatican Council. In Sancrosanctum Concilium, where the Church opened the Latin Church to the wider ability to concelebrate, the conciliar fathers made clear: “each priest shall always retain his right to celebrate Mass individually” (SC, 57). This has been consistently interpreted by the Church as the right of priests not to be required to concelebrate. The notion that the exercise of this right, given in an Apostolic Constitution issued by an Ecumenical Council and enshrined in universal law, may be the basis for the restriction of other rights and privileges is impossible to square with the provisions of law and Conciliar teaching. The stated goal of the Responsa ad dubia is to foster conformance to the liturgical reforms of the Second Vatican Council. That goal is compromised by a statement in these Responsa ad dubia that seems to repudiate of one of the express liturgical directives of that Council.

Response no. 5 has a problematic translation: the new Latin version of TC speaks of “licentia” – permission – that a bishop has to seek from the Holy See to allow priests ordained after the publication to TC to celebrate the Missale Romanum of 1962. However, the original Italian of the text mentioned an obligatory but non-binding consultation of the Holy See was required. Would you agree that this lack of clarity invokes Canon 18 and therefore unlawful and so the Response can be ignored?

According to the law as established by TC, bishops are obligated to seek the counsel of the Apostolic See before authorizing priests to celebrate according to the 1962 Missale Romanum, but there is no obligation to obtain the permission of the Holy See. The Responsa ad dubia does not change this requirement.

While the Apostolic See certainly has the right to require such authorization, it has not in fact done so. The CDWDS seems to have made a mistake about the nature of laws and their binding force.

As he does on so many things, St. Thomas Aquinas gives us the long-held classical definition of law: law is an ordinance of reason for the common good by one with care for the community and promulgated. In the widely recognized understanding of the law’s binding force, this last item – promulgation – is not just an appendage to the more essential definition. Promulgation is a necessary part of a law. Those who are subject to the law cannot be bound in justice to follow the law unless the law has been made known to them. And not simply made known to them, but made known through the proper organs of promulgation used by the law-making body. This provides certainly as to the agreed text (and therefore meaning) of the law and distinguishes other pronouncements from the legislator from those with coercive legal force.

Promulgation is not just a necessary part of civil law, but also of ecclesiastical law. The Code of Canon Law details how law is promulgated in the Church, both at the universal level from the Holy See and the particular level from an individual diocesan bishop. For universal law to have force, it is generally promulgated through the Acta Aposolicae Sedes (generally known by its abbreviation “AAS”), the official collection of acts of the Apostolic See. For a variety of reasons, in recent years promulgation has not done through AAS but through the Holy See’s newspaper, L’Osservatore Romano. (While AAS is freely available through the Holy See’s website, L’Osservatore Romano is regrettably accessible only through a “pay wall”.)  Normally, universal church laws do not take effect right away, but only come into force three months after they are promulgated. The Holy Father can, and often does, permit a greater or shorter time, but there is usually some period given so that those who must abide by the law may have time to read and understand its application.

This brings us to Traditonis Custodes (TC). Following the now recent custom, it was ordered to be promulgated in L’Osservatore Romano, and it was. The same day it was issued, July 16, 2021, it was published in Italian in the Papal newspaper, and ordered to take effect immediately on publication rather than wait the normal three months. While laws in the Church are almost always written in Latin, there is no legal requirement that universal laws must be in Latin to take effect. In the past, such laws have been in Latin because they have been published in Latin in AAS. However, for whatever reason, TC was not first published in Latin. As St. Thomas reminds us, and as the current law of the Church requires, the faithful are bound to follow laws only as they are promulgated. It would be contrary to natural justice for even an ecclesiastical authority to bind individuals to a law that had not been promulgated by the approved means of notification.

Hence, the confusion with the Responsa’s apparent declaration otherwise. In the promulgated, and therefore official, version of TC it indicates that for priests to celebrate the Mass according to the 1962 Missale Romanum, they must first request authorization from the diocesan bishop. Before granting that permission, the bishop must consult (consulterà) the Apostolic See. In canon law, that consultation is necessary for the legal validity of the permission, but the diocesan bishop could validly authorize the priest even if the counsel from the Apostolic See were negative.

However, when the CDWDS issued its recent dubia interpreting TC, in citing the provision regarding necessary permissions, it did not cite the officially promulgated Italian text, but a heretofore unpublished Latin translation, which is described as “official”. In the Latin text, it indicates that before the diocesan bishop can grant permission, he requires the approval (licentiam) of the Apostolic See. This is a rather significant change.

So what is the legal requirement?  Does the law require the diocesan bishop to consult with the Apostolic See, or obtain its permission?  As I hope the foregoing argument makes clear, the diocesan bishop is required only to consult with the Apostolic See. The promulgated text, and therefore the legally binding norm, is that provided in the Italian. It is not clear why the text in the CDWDS’s dubia has a markedly different meaning in translation, but its printing there has no legal force. Should the Holy See desire to require permission rather than consultation it may certainly do so. However, for the sake of the just application of law, it cannot expect the faithful to adhere to a norm that it has not promulgated through the means it itself has given for the proper recognition of what a law says.

Response no. 9, on mandating deacons and instituted ministers to obtain a bishop’s authorization to use the 1962, is also said to be unlawful as it goes beyond TC. Would you agree with this?

I would say that such a provision does not legally bind local bishops, deacons, or instituted ministers. Again, it is the role of the CDWDS to execute the law, not to create new legal requirements. Nothing in Summorum Pontificum, Ecclesiae universae, or Traditionis custodes touches upon deacons or instituted ministers. Therefore, following the interpretive maxim that laws that restrict freedoms are strictly interpreted, no such requirements exist in law for these ministers. The responsa are not a legislative document and therefore may not licitly impose new requirements. Of course, out of respect for the preeminence of the dicastery, Bishops are free to adopt this as particular law in their own dioceses, but they are not obligated to do so. Moreover, deacons and instituted ministers have no legal obligation to obtain any such approvals.

Responses 10 and 11, on refusing a priest to binate and being able to celebrate the old Mass for another group of faithful who have received authorization, are also said to go against Canon 905 (priests can celebrate Mass more than once a day “if pastoral need requires it”). Would you also agree with this?

I would say that the determination ought to be made according to the sound discretion of the local ordinary. The law is clear that such determinations are best made by those most able to determine the pastoral need, namely the diocesan bishops and the ordinaries of a diocese. Moreover, this is a fundamental precept of law in the Church, namely the importance of subsidiarity as a matter of justice. As the Catechism of the Catholic Church expresses the matter: “neither the state nor any larger society should substitute itself for the initiative and responsibility of individuals and intermediary bodies” (CCC 1894). This includes the respect dicasteries of the Apostolic See must show to the responsibility of local church officials in exercising their proper authority. In exercising their authority to grant such permission, local ordinaries should seriously consider the response of the CDWDS as its considered opinion. However, in deciding to grant such permissions the local ordinaries are obligated to consider the actual situation in their dioceses and the particular circumstances of the availability of priests in the local church.

These last two provisions, together with others, are also said to contrast the suprema lex, according to which the action of the Church authorities should favour the salus animarum, a principle of divine law received in Canon 1752. Would you agree this is a serious breach and should be highlighted?

When I teach the canon law of the sacraments, I always teach the future priests who are my students that the sacraments are meant to be given to the People of God. It is not the role of the priest to invent additional norms based on his own preferences to restrict the availability of the sacraments. This is an important expression of the fundamental legal maxim of the Church, salus animaurm suprema lex. The minister may from time to time in individual cases be required to deny or delay the giving of a sacrament, but he may only ever do so when there is a clear basis, founded in the law, for such a denial. No priest, nor even a bishop, has the right to restrict such access without a firm basis in law. Even Prefects of Dicasteries should avoid expressing restrictions on access to the Sacraments that do not appear in universal law. This is especially true of the liturgy, which as the Second Vatican Council reminded us, are never “private functions” but celebrations of the whole Church (SC, 26). To the extent that the Supreme Authority permits the offering of a rite of the liturgy, that public nature of the ritual must be respected.

What other canonical errors do you see in the text that I have not mentioned?

As mentioned before, it is the role of the Prefect of a Roman dicastery to execute the law operative in his ambit of authority. The best legal interpretation of Traditionis custodes is that its restrictions apply only to the use of the Missale Romanum. To the extent that the Responsa ad dubia attempt to limit the use of other liturgical books in use in 1962, they seem to go beyond that sphere. Thus, for example, the Instruction Ecclesiae universae gave explicit permission for the use of the Pontificale Romanum in use in 1962 for the conferral of major and minor orders and the sacrament of Confirmation, in certain circumstances. Those permissions are best understood as untouched by Traditionis custodes, and therefore diocesan bishops are free to continue to use those pursuant to those norms, although keeping in mind the cautions from the dicastery regarding their use.

Do these errors effectively nullify the Responsa ad dubia and, with it, the legal force of Traditionis Custodes? If so, are traditional priests and institutes at liberty to ignore these documents? Are they in fact duty-bound to ignore them for the good of the souls in their care?

As the Responsa ad dubia have no legally binding force, there is nothing to nullify. Local bishops should consider the document for what it is, an expression of the teaching and practice of the Congregation. Bishops should respect the considered judgment of a Prefect of a Roman Congregation. At the same time, they do need to consider the numerous canonical difficulties of the document. Ordinaries should work to consider as much of the Prefect’s views as legally possible, but aware of their own authority to interpret existing law.

Moreover, they should be guided by the interpretative hermeneutic of Pope Francis himself, who eschews rigid or inflexible applications of law. Pope Francis has often stated his view that general norms cannot take account of every possible case. Thus, the pastors of the Church, in their task of accompaniment, must not simply rigidly apply the general norms of law, but must apply laws in furtherance of their meaning and purpose, which is always the spiritual good of the People of God. I cannot imagine that Pope Francis would want local bishops to apply Traditionis custodes in an overly rigid or legalistic manner, but to be flexible and, above all, to meet the people of God where they are so as to better accompany them.

Any canonical weaknesses in the Responsa ad dubium have no effect on the legal authority of Traditionis custodes. It has modified, although not entirely eliminated, the legal permission to utilize the older rituals. Nonetheless, a maxim of the law is that general laws do not derogate from more particular laws. To the extent that religious institutes and societies of apostolic life have their own proper laws, they should be interpreted as much as possible to continue. Those executing Traditionis custodes should attempt to harmonize its provisions with these provisions and privileges, except to the extent that they are explicitly contrary.

Given they are without any mechanisms to physically enforce these restrictions, what measures could the Vatican employ to ensure they are obeyed?

As they do not have legislative force in se, there are no just legal mechanisms to be employed to enforce those provisions of the Responsa ad dubium that do not reflect the law established by Summorum Pontificum, Universae ecclesiae, and Traditionis custodes. The Congregation may seek the approval of the Supreme Legislator to issue true binding norms, but it must observe the canonical norms in promulgating any such document. As it has not chosen to do so, it cannot in justice demand a strict obedience to the Responsa, although it may rightly expect ordinaries to consider its advice respectfully.

Do you foresee any future canonical problems with the Responsa and TC?

We should support whole-heartedly the expressed desire of the Holy Father and the Prefect of the CDWDS regarding the need for liturgical unity. Nonetheless, there are significant questions raised by both TC and the Responsa ad dubia. I do not mean questions regarding the Supreme Authority of the Church to regulate the liturgy. Rather, the lack of sufficient attention to proper legal form and canonical tradition have raised some questions. I fear that this has also led to, and will continue to foster, confusion regarding the rights and duties of the lay faithful, and on something so central to the life of the Church as the conduct of the sacred liturgy.

At the same time, I recognize that there is a tendency on the part of some to engage in an overly technical and formalistic critique of these documents. This is not my intention, and I hope I have not done so here. I would encourage all those involved in this process to do their best to carry out the stated goal of the Holy Father, namely the maintenance of communion, and to interpret the actions of the Church’s authority in accord with that goal. At the same time, it is impossible for me as one who has spent most of his life in the study of law to ignore the legal questions raised by these documents, and the continued difficulty this will create in the future.

This is not mere legalism. As Pope Paul VI reminded the Roman Rota in 1970, the requirements of law and a legal system are a necessary to protect the common good and to foster the freedom of the members of a given society. This is just as true in the society of the Church. For the good of the Christian faithful, those who exercise authority in the Church have an obligation, rooted in natural law, to observe the formalities of ecclesiastical law. I regret that these Responsa ad dubia, despite their good intention, fall short in some ways in doing just that.

 Father Pius Pietrzyk is adjunct professor of canon law at the Pontifical Faculty of the Immaculate Conception (Dominican House of Studies) in Washington, DC