Bertrand Russell vs. Fr Frederick Copleston on God's Existence

I almost feel sorry for Lord Russell. Despite all his academic honours, he was so outclassed by Fr Copleston that it's sad!

From The Realist Guide

What do you think of Bertrand Russell?

The first thing I think of when I hear the name Bertrand Russell is the famous debate that he had with Frederick Copleston, S.J. on the BBC in 1948, and arguably lost. The debate is interesting on two counts. The first is that it pitted a notorious atheist against a Catholic priest. The second is that the two argued on the basis of reason alone. The priest defended the ability of reason, while the atheist arbitrarily denied its ability. Copleston continually pointed out that any series of contingent causes and effects must have a necessary being as cause of the series, for the series to have any existence or intelligibility at all. Russell only answered by saying that it is not permissible to look for the cause of such a series! In other words, he not only denied the ability of the mind to reason to such a cause, he further held that humans should not even ask the question.

Below is the debate from YouTube, followed by my summary of the debate.

Fr. C: ARGUMENT FROM CONTINGENCY

Empirical premise: There are contingent beings.

Contingent being = “one that does not contain within itself the reason for its existence”

To explain the existence of contingent beings, we must have recourse to a necessary being.

This is:

· Either false → in this case, there is no explanation at all for things

· Or true → in this case, there is a being that is the reason for its existence

Evidence for its truth: objects of experience do not contain the reason for their existence → There must be another being to explain them.

R: “Necessary Being”

The word “Necessary” can only be applied significantly to analytical propositions, i.e. ones which it is self-contradictory to deny.

Two types of truths (Leibniz’s division)

1. truths of reason → true for mind only → solely analytical proposition

2. truths of fact

C: I reject this division because, in the end, all propositions become analytic.

R: Analytic propositions are always complex and somewhat late.

“Rational animals are animals” is analytic.

“This is an animal” is non-analytic.

C: “There is a contingent being” is not analytic.

If this is admitted, there must also be a necessary being, because it follows necessarily from the first proposition.

R: I don’t admit the idea of a “necessary being” nor that there is any meaning in calling beings “contingent.”

C: (He re-explains the terms.)

The existence of neither of us can be explained without reference to something outside us.

We obviously depended upon our parents.

Do you or do you not understand the meaning of the term “contingent being”?

It would be hard for you to claim that you do not understand the terms, though you may say that no “necessary being” exists. If you do not understand them, then how can you say that a necessary being does not exist!?

R: You seem to be bringing us back to the ontological argument, wherein we have an idea of a being whose essence is his existence, and so his existence is analytic.

It seems to me to be impossible and raises the question of what one means by “existence.”

A subject named can never be said significantly to exist, but only a subject described.

C: You are saying that we should not say “T S Eliot exists” but “The author of ‘Murder in the Cathedral’ exists.”

“The cause of the world exists” is certainly a meaningful proposition.

You may say that the world has no cause, but how can you say that the proposition that the world exists is meaningless?

Has the world a cause? Does a cause of the world exist? Everyone understands the meaning of these questions!

R: Certainly, it is a question that has meaning.

But the statement that “God is the cause of the world” or “God exists” does not have meaning, if God is a proper name.

Because these propositions cannot be analytic. Just like the proposition “the existent round square exists.”

It appears to be an analytic proposition, but it is not.

C: You cannot say that the “round square does not exist” unless you have a concept of existence!

I agree that “existent round square” has no meaning.

R: I am saying that the same thing applies to the phrase “necessary being.”

C: It seems we are at an impasse, because “necessary being” has meaning for me, but not for you.

R: Well, we can keep going in some way. Would you not agree that a “necessary being” would be one whose essence involves existence?

C: Yes, that is the case, but I am not arguing His existence from His definition, as I do not hold that His essence can be known.

I am arguing from the world of experience.

R: But if a being had sufficient knowledge, he would be able to say that here is a being whose essence involves existence.

So, we know that there is a being whose essence is his existence, but we do not know his essence.

C: Yes. We do not know His essence a priori. It is only a posteriori, from experience, that we can come to the knowledge of the existence of that being.

From there, we argue that his essence must be his existence, for if it were not, some sufficient reason for the existence of God would have to be found beyond God.

R: So it is all about sufficient reason. What does that mean? Something being caused?

C: Not necessarily. Cause is a type of sufficient reason. Sufficient reason is an explanation for a being that is adequate.

R: When is an explanation adequate? Isn’t the rubbing of a match on a box an adequate explanation for its flame?

C: It is a partial explanation, but not an adequate one, which is a total one, i.e. one to which nothing else can be added.

R: We ought not to expect to have such an explanation. It cannot be gotten.

C: It is one thing to say that one has not found it and quite another to say that it cannot be found, which is extreme.

Here, I am looking for the cause of the totality of objects which we call the universe. You say that the universe or my own existence is unintelligible.

R: Not unintelligible, but inexplicable. Intelligibility has to do with a thing in itself, not its relations.

C: The universe is unintelligible if there is no God. And an infinite series of horizontal causes does not remedy the situation.

If you add chocolates, you just get more chocolates. If you add contingent beings, you get more contingent beings. You never get a necessary being.

But you are saying that it is illegitimate to even raise the question of what would explain the existence of any object.

R: It’s ok to ask about the cause of a thing.

C: But why stop there? Why not ask about the cause of the totality of objects?

R: Because I see no reason to. We derive our notion of cause from observation. I see no reason whatsoever to posit a cause for the whole.

Your argument seems to be: Every man who exists has a mother. Therefore the human race has a mother. But the human race does not have a mother.

C: This is not my argument. If I were saying that every object has a phenomenal cause, therefore the whole series has a phenomenal cause, then you would have a point.

My argument is this: Every object has a phenomenal cause, which causes could go on forever. But the series of phenomenal causes is an insufficient explanation for the existence of the series. Therefore, the series itself must have a transcendent cause.

R: That’s assuming that not just particular things need a cause, but the totality of particular things needs a cause. But I see no reason whatsoever for saying that.

C: The series of events is either caused or not caused. If it is not caused, then it is sufficient to itself and therefore necessary.

But it cannot be necessary, because each member is contingent. And the totality of events is not a reality separate from its members. Thus, it cannot be necessary.

The statement that the world is simply there and inexplicable destroys all science! And so just as physicists look for causes of phenomena, metaphysicians do also.

R: This is an unwarrantable extension. Physicists look for causes without thinking that they will find them everywhere.

The idea that the world itself has an explanation, in my mind, is a mistake. I don’t see why it should have an explanation.

C: So, your general position is that it is illegitimate to even ask the cause of the world.

R: Yes, that is my position.

C: Well, that makes it very difficult to discuss it then!

R: Yes, let us pass on to something else.