The Medina ‘Constitution’ and the Myth of Islam’s Democratic Origins

The lengths to which the jihadists will go to disguise the fact that they are the enemy of our entire Græco-Roman Catholic Civilisation and Culture

From The European Conservative

By Fr Mario Alexis Portella, UJD

Describing the Medina document as evidence of “constitutional democracy” in contemporary terms imposes modern ideas onto a seventh-century Arabian society where such concepts were clearly not present.

Not too long ago I engaged in a discussion with a Muslim individual who asserted our American democracy can be found in some elements of the document commonly known as The Constitution of Medina, or Ṣaḥīfat al-Madīna, which occupies an important place in discussions of early Islamic political history. It is sometimes presented as evidence that Islam developed a form of constitutional democracy centuries before the emergence of modern Western democracy, and particularly before the founding of the United States.

The document is an unusually early example of a written political and legal agreement associated with Muhammad’s community at Yathrib (now Medina) following the hijrah (migration) from Mecca in 622 A.D. It regulates relations among different groups, establishes mutual obligations, addresses collective security, and recognizes the religious identity of Jewish participants. Modern scholars have therefore understandably regarded it as a significant document in the history of Islamic political organization.

Yet acknowledging its historical importance is not the same as identifying it with modern constitutional democracy.

The central problem is anachronism. The Medina Charter can reasonably be described as constitutional in a broad, functional or historical sense. It is much harder to defend the claim that it represents ‘democracy’ in the modern political sense of popular sovereignty, representative government, political equality, separation of powers, and legally protected individual rights.

A covenant, not a modern constitution

The first difficulty concerns terminology: the expression ‘Constitution of Medina’ is conventional, but it is not a neutral description. Emeritus Professor of Arabic Language and Literature at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Michael Lecker, whose study treats the document in detail, deliberately uses the more neutral Arabic term Kitāb (script or book), noting that “constitution” can be misleading.

Earlier scholarship has likewise emphasized that the document does not correspond neatly to a modern constitution. The late British scholar Robert Bertram Serjeant, for example, argued that what is conventionally treated as a single constitution is better understood as a collection of several related documents or agreements.

The document nevertheless performs functions that can reasonably be called constitutional in a broad sense. It establishes obligations among groups, regulates the payment of blood-money and the treatment of captives, provides for mutual assistance, addresses warfare and collective defense, and establishes Muhammad as the ultimate arbiter in certain disputes. Modern scholarship has consequently treated it as an important early legal instrument governing the newly organized community at Medina.

What it does not provide, however, is a representative legislature, an electoral system, an independent judiciary, a separation of governmental powers, or a doctrine that political authority derives from the consent of equal individual citizens—traits that are fundamental of a constitutional democracy.

A modern constitution generally does more than record obligations among political communities. It establishes the structure of government and, in constitutional-democratic systems, places legal limits upon governmental authority. Political offices are defined by institutional rules rather than by the personal authority of a single religious and political leader. Citizens possess political rights as individuals, and mechanisms exist through which rulers can be held accountable or removed.

Religious pluralism is not the same as liberal equality

Another argument frequently made on behalf of the document concerns its treatment of Jews. The Constitution plainly recognizes Jewish participants and establishes obligations governing their relationship with Muhammad’s community. It provides that Jewish groups retain their religion and participate in specified political and military arrangements. This is historically significant and should not be dismissed.

At the same time, recognition of religious communities is not identical to modern citizenship based upon equal individual political rights.

The political unit described in the document is not simply a collection of autonomous individuals possessing identical rights regardless of religion. It is a network of groups, clans, allies, and religious communities bound together by reciprocal obligations. The terminology itself distinguishes among categories such as muʾminūn (believers), Muhājirūn (converts to Islam),  Muslimūn (Muslims), and Jews. Lecker’s analysis emphasizes precisely these distinctions rather than treating all participants as members of a modern undifferentiated citizenry.

The more historically responsible conclusion is narrower: the document demonstrates early Islamic political accommodation and alliance-building, but it does not establish the existence of modern liberal equality.

That distinction becomes particularly important when later Islamic jurisprudence is brought into the discussion. Classical Islamic legal traditions developed complex rules concerning the political and legal status of Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as distinct rules relating to gender, family law, inheritance, and other areas. Those later institutions should neither be projected backward onto the Medinan document without qualification nor ignored when evaluating the broader history of Islamic political thought.

The question of popular sovereignty

Contemporary democratic theory emerged from a set of interconnected concepts: the notion that political authority necessitates a form of public consent; the principle that rulers are bound by law; the belief that citizens hold political rights; and the idea that governmental power can be constrained and modified through human political mechanisms.

In contrast, Islamic political thought evolved within a distinct theological context.

The Qur’an repeatedly emphasiyes Allah’s ultimate authority: “Allah… makes none to share in his decision and his rule.” (Sura 18, 26) In Islamic doctrine, divine sovereignty is not simply a metaphor for political power; it is intrinsically linked to the belief that Allah serves as the ultimate source of legitimate religious and moral law, with Islamic jurists, following the death of Muhammad, acting as the exclusive interpreters of divine law.

This establishes a notable conceptual distinction from theories advocating for popular sovereignty.

A democratic framework may enable citizens, via legitimate political institutions, to modify standard legislation and even constitutional provisions. Conversely, a political system based on divine law inherently restricts certain issues from the unbounded power of human legislators.

Questioning the authenticity

The characterization of the Charter as a constitution is, at best, debatable, especially considering the ambiguity among scholars about its initial formulation as a unified document. Furthermore, there are doubts concerning its historical authenticity, as only fragments from early Islamic sources have survived. These fragments first emerge in Ibn Ishaq’s Sirah Rasul Allah, the earliest biography of Muhammad, composed approximately 150 years after his passing.

An essential point to note is Ibn Ishaq’s solitary mention of the Charter:

The Messenger of God wrote a document between the Emigrants and the Ansar, and in it he made a treaty and covenant with the Jews, establishing them in their religion and possessions, and assigning to them rights and duties.

Modern scholarship has reached a more nuanced position as to the dating and authenticity of the Charter. This academic dispute holds significance as it enhances the historical argument when approached correctly, rather than diminishing it. The inquiry should not solely focus on whether the ‘Charter’ is authentic or a forgery. A more pertinent question is to ascertain what the existing text truly signifies, the timeline of its various elements’ formulation, and their roles in the political evolution of Medina.

The Ṣaḥīfat al-Madīna can be seen as an early political document that is either constitutional or covenantal in nature. However, labeling it as a document of “constitutional democracy” in contemporary terms imposes modern ideas such as popular sovereignty, representative governance, individual political equality, separation of powers, and electoral accountability onto a seventh-century Arabian society, where these institutions and concepts were clearly not evident.