Designing a Conservative State?

This sounds good, but can anyone point to a separatist/secessionist party that is not hard-left or in the pocket of the libertarian 'Right'?

From The European Conservative

By Pepijn Leonard J. Demortier

When secession serves the needs of political homogeneity and self-determination, it might actually serve the common good.

I grew up in Flanders, the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium. What my birthplace shares with Catalonia, Bavaria, and Quebec, among others, is a strong nationalist underbelly. This nationalist underbelly acts as a dormant political volcano, sometimes bubbling up and erupting in calls for secession, for an independent Flanders. But while well-defined nations can push for an independent state with some legitimacy, this often seems less self-evident to political groups. Today, let me make a case for such a politically-homogeneous state—a conservative state.

Theories of Secession 

The demand for secession is fundamentally a demand for political self-determination. There are many paths to such political self-determination, where a specific group can live its life in a specific area in a free and self-chosen manner. Secession is such a path, but at the same time one of the most far-reaching options to achieve this political self-determination. That does not detract from the fact that secession can be justified, or that there can at least be a moral right to secession. There are two main sets of theories which argue that secession, under certain conditions, is justified—these being the ‘Remedial Right Only’ theories and the ‘Primary Right’ theories. Remedial Right Only theories share the central claim that secession can be justified only when a particular group suffers severe injustices, and secession could provide a suitable (last) remedy to these injustices. The remedial aspect is thus fundamental, making Remedial Right Only theories ab initio reactive.

This sets them apart from Primary Right theories, which need not necessarily be reactive, but will also tend to argue for secession in an ‘active’ manner. Primary Right theories share the central claim that certain groups can have a (general) right to secede in the absence of any injustice. This can be based on either ascriptive group characteristics (i.e., predetermined factors such as a shared religion, language, or history, etc), or on a shared desire to secede from a state, without these ascriptive group characteristics having to be present. There is a lot to be said for both theories, but since this is only a humble political exploration—rather than a political manifesto—we are not going to examine these theories in detail. Instead, we shall simply zoom in on the case for a politically-ideologically homogeneous state.

To avoid any confusion about what exactly is meant by a ‘political secession’ in this essay, I will briefly clarify the matter. First, a political group should be understood as a group with a very similar worldview, not necessarily but sometimes linked by a shared history, culture, and religion. Socialists, communists, libertarians, traditional conservatives, or reactionaries are examples of such political groups. In short, political secession comes down to the fact that if, for instance, a sufficiently large group of communists wants to live together in a communist system, with a state corresponding to it, they should be allowed to do so. Likewise, if a sufficiently large group of reactionaries wants to live under an absolute monarchy, that too must be possible. Consider now five arguments for such a political-secession.

1. Argument from Legitimate Expectations 

In both law and political philosophy, there exists the idea of legitimate expectations. In law, this principle regulates the future, casting pre-legal agreements and promises into a legally enforceable system. In everyday life, people undertake a great deal of initiatives with an eye to the future. They expect that the sacrifices they make today will continue to be meaningful in the future, within a culture that will value their work. In a politically heterogeneous state, however, that guarantee is completely absent. Whatever political direction a country happens to take will determine what that nation-state will look like in a given number of years. Consequently, if one accepts the importance of legitimate expectations and wishes for them actually to exist, that must be guaranteed by a static, politically stable framework.

However, the Achilles heel of this argument must be noted, namely that this idea is strongly true for both political conservatives and moderates, but much less so for more radical beliefs such as reactionaries and communists. Radically breaking with the present day destroys the larger part of legitimate expectations, although these expectations will be better guaranteed afterwards in a self-selected political system. That, in turn, is the antidote to this counter-argument.

2. Argument from Freedom of Association and Dissociation 

Political philosopher Christopher Wellman argues that political self-determination can be compared to marital self-determination. Everyone is free to choose who they want to marry, and who they do not want to marry. This relationship is based entirely on freedom of association, and thus also implies the right to renounce marriage through unilateral divorce. This freedom is thus simultaneously always accompanied by a freedom of dissociation. This is a fundamental insight and can even be explored a little further. For one, it can be argued that free political association is perhaps the most fundamental form of freedom of association due to its strong entanglement with the boundaries within which one can live one’s life. Whether and to whom a person can marry at all, what religion he can openly adhere to, whether a person can join a provocative drama club or whether or not a woman will become a mother (e.g., through a national ban on abortions), are all matters that depend on political decisions. Other forms of free association are therefore dependent on political free association—and on true political self-determination, which, as argued, can only be realized within the politically homogeneous state.

3. Remedial Argument 

Although a form of Primary Right theory of secession is typically defended, there is indeed a remedial aspect at play in this case. That remedial aspect is not entirely unimportant, as it can give a certain moral gravitas to our case, not least in convincing those who have difficulty accepting a mere Primary Right theory. According to this remedial argument, some political groups suffer similar oppression and rights violations as certain ethnic or linguistic minorities do in some nation-states. This is a controversial claim, but at the same time far from a gratuitous one. The argument cannot be developed extensively here, but nevertheless consider two examples. 

Certain political groups are (potentially) forced into situations that are entirely contrary to their political and moral beliefs. Consequently, a lack of political homogeneity can jeopardize personal integrity, or strongly challenge it and inadvertently force people into unwanted actions of civil disobedience, rule departure, or conscientious objection. 

In addition, it is widely known that being a ‘political misfit’ can be detrimental in a society. Those who openly promote so-called political extremes (AfD, MAGA, Vlaams Belang) often face social stigma, and all the consequences that come with it. Thus, it is well known that in academia, education, or consultancy—a fortiori in the Anglo-Saxon world—open adherence to the political extreme can be at the expense of further career opportunities. A politically homogeneous state remedies all of the above problems. This remedial aspect strengthens their moral right to secede from the oppressive, politically heterogeneous nation-state.

4. Argument from Efficiency 

The argument from efficiency does not directly deal with having a moral right to secession, but with a practical reason that bridges the gap to turn this right into an actual secession. A shared and coherent worldview in the new state could contribute to policy efficiency and the absence of internal conflict. Today in politics, a vast amount of time is lost in debating, arguing, introducing and later reversing policies, only to reintroduce them in the next legislature. It suffices here to think of Dobbs v. Jackson or the trouble over reducing nitrogen emissions in Europe. If the state were organized by people with a corresponding worldview, these delays, which cost a great deal of money and political energy, would probably be far less frequent. So if one wants to create an efficient state, one must evolve towards a politico-homogeneous state.

5. Argument of Political Tranquility and Tradition as Enabling Conditions for Progress 

Nicolas Boileau is often remembered for his saying: “Du choc des idées jaillit la lumière”—from the clash of ideas comes light. However, two fundamental aspects are often overlooked in our thinking about progress: tranquility and traditions. Traditions, the basic conservative principle goes, allow people to focus their attention on progress. It is only because large parts of our living world are regulated through customs and traditions that we have any time at all to dwell on complex, non-pressing problems. Regarding this, consider the following thought from the Belgian conservative philosopher Herman De Dijn:

It is a persistent prejudice of Enlightenment thinking that traditions, the inherited symbolic orders within which human life acquires meaning and significance, are only obstacles to freedom and progress. In fact, the opposite is the case: it was only through the inconspicuous survival of traditions, which are not based on strictly rational insights and attitudes, that ‘progress’ could have come about and flourished. Rationality in the scientific, technical or economic sense is only possible on the basis of the persistence of non-explicit, not consciously organised elements or conditions of a cultural, social or psychological nature.

The importance of traditions and related concepts such as tranquility and peace were already emphasized in antiquity and the Middle Ages, for example by Marsilius of Padua in Defensor Pacis and Christine de Pizan in the Book of Peace. Needless to say, tradition is not the same as enduring tranquility or peace. However, tradition largely rests on these two principles and works in tandem with them. Together, they form fertile ground for the virtue of trust—a relationship that is exceedingly crucial in virtually all economic, moral, and political matters.

A potential counter-argument is that major scientific and technological inventions are always made in times of great crisis and war, the chief example being the atomic bomb during WWII. The question, however, is whether these technologically fruitful periods always benefit humanity. While they often produced positive side effects, from improvements in healthcare to intellectual sophistication, they more often than not have a morally reprehensible purpose: to defeat the enemy as efficiently as possible. Is the world really a better place now that we have atomic bombs at our disposal? I doubt it. Consequently, the rebuttal of the counter-argument is based on the conservative quip made by the U.S. Senator John Randolph of Roanoke: “Providence moves slowly, but the devil always hurries.”

Just a pipe dream?

It is, of course, inconceivable that such a sweeping and controversial idea as political-ideological secession is free of all error and controversy. Therefore, we must also take into account possible counterarguments. Such an opposing reflection could be, for instance, the social upheaval and bureaucratic nightmare that, with a probability bordering on certainty, would accompany a political secession. As a result, there would not be much left of calm, peace, and trust. In fact, the new situation would potentially be worse than the previous one, and such a socio-political experiment could turn into a terrible period of crisis and uncertainty. Consequently, if arguments based on efficiency and political tranquility are really to be taken to heart, it is appropriate not to pursue secession, but to try to maximize political self-determination within the current boundaries of the nation-state. This is a valid concern and consequently a robust counterargument. However, the counter-argument fails to recognize that this does not detract from the moral claim to secession and to recognize that the prospect of a temporary period of turmoil should not stand in the way of a potentially better future. The chaos argument can be raised against just about any political change, and is consequently pernicious to the foundations of democracy. 

Another counter-argument is the practical impracticability in relation to territoriality. It is not unfounded to raise the following question: in a world where territoriality is deeply intertwined with the nation-state, where should such a new state be located? Even if the right to secession of these groups were recognised, actual secession would be impossible because of the territoriality problem. In tandem with the previous counter-argument, a political-ideological secession increasingly seems to turn into an unrealizable utopia, or mere philosophical thought experiment.

However, political groups are often already territorially embedded in a particular region. Thus, some land or language borders are also de facto political borders. There are many examples of this phenomenon, such as the Bible Belt in the U.S. and the Netherlands, or rightward-leaning Flanders and leftward-leaning Wallonia. Even classic fault lines like city-periphery are often accompanied by major differences in political-ideological terms. Think of the relatively progressive Budapest surrounded by conservative Hungary or progressive Madrid surrounded by rural, deeply Catholic Spain. On electoral maps, these differences often become particularly tangible.

This observation means that territoriality need not necessarily be a major problem for political-ideological secession. Since political groups are already often concentrated in certain areas, regions, or cities, a workable politico-homogeneous state could perhaps be drawn out. It would be naive to think that such a territorial division would be easy, even with this strong ideological concentration in certain areas. Yet even in the current situation, people seem to be moving, somewhat and perhaps unconsciously, towards living together with their ideological allies. People with a shared worldview seek each other out, building their own communities within a given territory. These already clearly demarcated areas might particularly qualify for our secession case. 

Final Considerations

The previous considerations have made it clear that to achieve true political self-determination, far-reaching measures are needed. One of the most extreme paths, an ideology-based associative Primary Right theory, presents itself here as an attractive option. Political secession seems, if one accepts the arguments set out in this essay, a morally justified demand. At the same time, it meets many practical concerns, such as the evolution towards a more efficient state (which in theory will benefit the lives of its citizens), a better guarantee of legitimate expectations, the reduction of politically inspired cases of civil disobedience, rule departure and conscientious objection, and a more robust basis for tranquility, peace, and trust. Above all, a Primary Right secession of political groups is not as inconceivable as it prima facie appears to be. There are legitimate arguments to be made for such a secession, and those who want to achieve true political self-determination are sometimes forced to push both the theoretical and societal boundaries.

Pictured: Pieter Brueghel the Elder, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons