Two Paths to Realism: Thomism and Phenomenology on the Relation of Mind and World

With Walter Hopp, PhD, Professor of Philosophy & Chairman, Philosophy Dept, Boston University.

The purpose of this presentation is to examine Husserlian and Thomistic accounts of intentionality and assess how well each coheres with and supports a metaphysically realist position. I will argue that despite numerous similarities and shared virtues, the Husserlian account is preferable, both in its own right and in its strength as a realist-friendly theory. With its central distinction between intuitive and empty acts, Husserl’s theory is better situated to account for the subjective phenomenal character of experience. Husserl’s theory has more resources to explain how very different mental acts, such as perception and judgment, or rational intuition and thought, can intend and converge upon precisely the same objects. Perhaps counterintuitively, it is also a more plausible realist theory than Thomism precisely because it does not require that a veridical perceptual or cognitive act must in any way take on or share the “form” of its object.