Sunday’s Vote Has a Clear Message to Tusk: The Public Is Not Impressed

Poland is on the knife's edge. If Trzaskowski wins the Presidency, it falls to the Left, anti-Polish and anti-Western. If Nawrocki wins, its on the path to sanity.

From The European Conservative

By Artur Ciechanowicz

Will Poland support the march toward a European superstate, or help stop it?

Poland has held the first round of its presidential election—and the outcome is revealing. While a majority of Poles remain unconvinced by Donald Tusk’s ruling coalition, they have not forgotten the errors made by former prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki either.

In the post-communist Third Republic (since 1989), Poland has seen only one presidential election decided in the first round: in 2000, when Aleksander Kwaśniewski secured re-election with over 50% of the vote. Typically, the first round is used to determine which two candidates will proceed to a final run-off.

However, beyond selecting finalists, the first round serves as a reliable barometer of public sentiment—far more accurate than any opinion poll. It reflects which ideas are gaining traction, what issues voters deem urgent, and which political forces are seen as credible. Candidates often use this stage to assess support, test campaign narratives, and prepare for upcoming parliamentary contests.

Sunday’s vote was groundbreaking in several respects—and highly revealing.

If these elections were a referendum on the liberal government of Donald Tusk, the message is clear: the public is not impressed. The three candidates representing the governing coalition—Rafał Trzaskowski (Civic Platform, 31.36%), Szymon Hołownia (Third Way, 4.99%), and Magdalena Biejat (New Left, 4.23%)—collectively secured just 40.5% of the vote. In parliamentary terms, this would leave the government without a majority, with Third Way and the New Left failing to cross the electoral threshold to enter parliament.

The reasons are numerous: despite fiery rhetoric opposing the EU’s migration pact, preparations for its implementation (e.g., integration centres for foreigners) are quietly underway; the record budget deficit and shrinking tax revenues raise fears of a resurgence in VAT fraud; the government stands accused of undermining the rule of law, attacking judicial independence, and using state institutions—prosecutors, courts, and intelligence services—for partisan ends; major 2023 campaign promises remain unfulfilled, including a tax-free allowance of 60,000 zł (€14,000) and the construction of 300,000 public housing units.

Half of respondents in recent polls say Tusk’s economic policies are not improving the country’s prospects.

Despite all this, the liberal-left bloc still performs respectably—a testament to strong identity-based voting, particularly among urban progressives. In flood-ravaged towns left to fend for themselves, Trzaskowski still managed to win almost 40% of the vote.

Although the ruling coalition stumbled, the main opposition conservative Law and Justice (PiS) can hardly claim victory. Their candidate, Karol Nawrocki—technically an independent but backed by PiS—secured 29.54%, roughly mirroring PiS’s core base.

This shows the party has yet to rebuild the broader electoral coalition that brought it to power in 2015: social conservatives, traditional Catholics, pro-lifers, farmers, small business owners, working-class voters, and urban populists. That unity began to fracture after 2017, when Mateusz Morawiecki replaced the popular Beata Szydło as Prime Minister.

Under Morawiecki, PiS sought to court urban liberals and the mainstream media with measures such as a failed animal welfare bill that alienated farmers, while sidelining its traditional allies. The government’s heavy-handed approach during the COVID-19 pandemic, including threats against unvaccinated soldiers, further eroded trust.

Post-2022, PiS’s enthusiastic embrace of Ukraine following Russia’s invasion alienated many voters. Ukrainian citizens were given priority in healthcare, welfare, and pensions, while Polish farmers and hauliers struggled against unfair competition. Criticism of Budapest and Viktor Orbán for not adopting a similarly pro-Ukrainian stance added to the disillusionment.

Morawiecki’s naïveté in EU negotiations—agreeing to the conditionality mechanism for EU funds, the Green Deal, and binding reform “milestones”—is now seen by many in PiS as a historic blunder. Though Nawrocki tried to distance himself from the former PM, it appears largely rhetorical.

The biggest winners? Grzegorz Braun (6.34%) and Sławomir Mentzen of the right-wing Confederation alliance (14.8%). Together, they not only captured disaffected PiS voters but also reached nearly 20% of the electorate with messages once deemed too radical for mainstream discourse.

More importantly, they broke Poland’s entrenched two-party system of PO vs. PiS. This shift has provoked visible panic among liberal elites.

Journalist Adam Michnik, writing in Gazeta Wyborcza, warned of a “fascist coalition” and called for democratic forces to “wake up” before it’s too late. Feminist writer Magdalena Środa accused the country of antisemitism based on Braun’s result. Such sweeping accusations overlook the complexity of the electorate. Even assuming Braun’s entire base held problematic views (a highly dubious claim), it still leaves over 93% of voters unaccounted for. Środa’s sweeping condemnation suggests a deep-rooted disdain for her own society.

Another journalist, Tomasz Lis, meanwhile, called for “total mobilisation” and a relentless attack on Nawrocki, invoking “fear” as a campaign weapon.

The fate of the presidency now hinges on the supporters of Mentzen and Braun. Both have issued lists of demands that must be addressed if their backing is to be secured. They both concentrate on assertiveness towards Ukraine, guarantees that Poland will not be dragged into war, and protection of sovereignty.

It’s often said that the Polish presidency is a symbolic office with limited powers. While formally true, this belies the post’s real influence. The president is directly elected and thus enjoys strong democratic legitimacy—arguably more so than the prime minister, who is often a party appointee. Moreover, the president can veto legislation, initiate bills, and even dissolve parliament. The powers may be limited, but they are far from decorative. As the political landscape fractures and polarisation grows, the presidency is poised to play a decisive role in shaping the next phase of Poland’s future.

These elections matter not only for Poland’s internal politics—they will also shape its role in a rapidly changing European Union.

In the current European context, this presidential contest carries exceptional weight. It may determine whether Poland endorses the increasingly centralised direction of the Brussels oligarchy or resists it. A victory for Rafał Trzaskowski—regardless of what he says now, given his record of political expediency and opportunism—would signal a surrender of national sovereignty.

By contrast, while doubts remain about the credibility of Karol Nawrocki’s political backers, his win would at least offer hope of halting the construction of a European superstate.

In summary, these elections go far beyond local politics. They signal growing public discontent with Donald Tusk’s government, as well as the emergence of a new right-wing alternative that challenges both PiS and the liberal mainstream. Voters are increasingly rejecting the government’s Ukraine-first stance and EU-driven migration policies. But more importantly, the result may determine Poland’s role in shaping—or resisting—the centralist ambitions of Brussels. Will Poland support the march toward a European superstate, or help stop it? The second round is more than a contest between two candidates. It is a choice between two visions for Poland’s future—and potentially for Europe’s too.

Pictured: Sławomir Mentzen, Presidential candidate of the Confederation (Konfederacja) Party