The End of the Vatican II Era and the Future Conclave

The end of the Vatican II era can not come soon enough! The boomers who have invested their entire lives in it are dying off, and the future looks increasingly rosy.

From Rorate Cæli

By Serre Verweij

Aging Bergoglians and the End of an Era

Pope Francis has been suffering from chronic health problems for over three years now and was in the hospital for over a month. Bishops and cardinals have been increasingly acting as if he were incapacitated, some trying to quickly promote new projects with his alleged approval. Cardinals have been maneuvering for the next conclave, which could be both a referendum on the legacy of Pope Francis and synodality, as well as the so-called ‘spirit of the Second Vatican Council’. 

While that battle is being prepared, bishops and cardinals, including many appointed by Pope Francis, are distancing themselves from Pope Francis’ supposed agenda. They are preparing for the future, which is currently unclear and uncertain. This raises the question of what will happen to the legacy of Pope Francis. Has he been able to consolidate it?

Unbreakable blocks of bishops 

In 2023, the bishops in the United States once again chose firm and uncompromising voices of orthodoxy to lead the Bishops’ Conference and most of its important commissions. Previous elections were also viewed as referenda on Pope Francis and every time he lost. La Croix International referred to the 2017 election as American bishops giving the middle finger to Pope Francis and said the Pope would need five more years to change the American episcopate. It’s been seven years now and little has changed.

In 2024, Spain likewise saw a radical turnover in its episcopal leadership. The centre-left Omella, named Archbishop and Cardinal by Francis early in his pontificate, but who is already 78, was replaced by the firmly conservative Luis Argüello. The Executive Committee was monopolized by the conservative faction too. The largely symbolic vice-presidency was given to Francis’ new and rising protégé José Cobo Cano. Even Cano, however, has proven to be quite orthodox in matters of sexual ethics and has strongly defended priestly celibacy. He also compared gay marriage to a Eucharist with Coca Cola. Now he has removed Elías Royón, a Jesuit close to Pope Francis, from an important function in his Archdiocese.

Poland likewise had an election for the Bishops’ Conference this year and Pope Francis didn’t gain much ground there, either. In Poland virtually all bishops are considered conservative by global standards, but there was still a split between firm hardliners and moderates who are evidently less far removed from the vision of Pope Francis, even while doctrinally being conservative. While hardliners had no clear candidates and were expected to favor compromise figures, moderates had Cardinal Ryś and Archbishop Polak. Ryś was named cardinal by Pope Francis last year and, similar to Cobo Cano in Spain, he is known to be liberal by Polish standards, in spite of being a firm opponent of abortion, the blessing of homosexual relationships, changes in priestly celibacy and artificial contraception.

Both the new president and vice-president ended up being centrist compromise figures (again by Polish standards) and the new president, Tadeusz Wojda, has refused to apply Traditionis Custodes in his Archdiocese and taken a strong stance against the LGBT+- movement in Poland. 

Pope John Paul II strategically and thoroughly packed dioceses in the USA and Australia with bishops who were on the same page with trusted supporters like Cardinal Pell, providing a steady stream of orthodox nominations. Benedict XVI similarly packed the Netherlands and Canada. 

Due to retiring bishops a possible radical shakeup of the episcopates in countries like the USA and Spain has been repeatedly touted and anticipated; and also constantly delayed. One reason is that most papal nuncios tend to be fairly orthodox. Even Christophe Pierre actually recommends conservative bishops and opposed McElroy as the new Archbishop of Boston. While aging progressives such as Cupich and Tobin lobbied hard for a progressive prelate in Boston, retiring Archbishop of Boston, Cardinal O'Malley (a centrist), successfully pushed back together with Pierre and got moderate conservative Richard Henning installed instead. Henning has thus far not acted more progressive than O'Malley. Sources informed The Pillar that the progressive lobbying actually had the opposite effect on Pope Francis. Pope Francis’ dislike for his own allies becoming too demanding further complicates any attempt at modernist advancement within the American episcopacy. Next, it was said that the same thing has happened with regards to the new Archbishop of Washington. Pope Francis apparently turned against Cupich, Tobin and McElroy and was instead predicted to appoint Bishop Shawn McKnight as the new Archbishop, a prelate more conservative than both the current Archbishop Wilton Gregory and his predecessor Donald Wuerl, a candidate closer to Pierre. Trump returning to the presidency was suspected to have contributed to the appointment of a less leftist bishop. The Vatican seemed less likely to seek confrontation with Pope Francis this time as ironically Pope Francis and Trump have both taken a more dovish stance regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and are more inclined to push for a peace based on compromise. 

However, suddenly there was, as The Pillar confirmed, an unexpected reversal by Pope Francis, where McElroy was suddenly appointed to serve in D.C. after all. This decision perfectly sums up many of the biggest political missteps during the pontificate of Pope Francis, including listening to the advice of ideological radicals, making last minute changes to important decisions and making decisions that are both self-sabotaging and have little long term benefit. McElroy turned 71 in February, therefore a future Pope can replace him in a little over four years. Additionally, Pope Francis will have to quickly appoint a modernist replacement for McElroy in San Diego. It also decreases the chances of healthy diplomatic relationships between the Vatican and the new Trump administration and makes it more difficult for Pope Francis, and for his (alleged) intended successor Cardinal Zuppi, to work constructively with Trump on establishing peace in Ukraine. Furthermore, McElroy has been so openly radical on issues such as female ordination, that if anything, it helped to undermine the Synod on Synodality. Finally, McElroy, much like his predecessors Wilton Gregory and Donald Wuerl, has had dubious connections to the disgraced pederast and abuser Theodore McCarrick; so, his appointment will likely worsen criticism of Pope Francis’ dealing with clerical sexual abuse.

Other recent archbishop appointments made before Francis was hospitalized have pulled the balance of American archbishops (but not the episcopacy as a whole) to the left, but only slightly. The conservative archbishop of Detroit, Allen Vigneron, being replaced by Edward Weisenburger is the most significant leftward shift, yet even Weisenburger is no Cupich. He supported a declaration against bullying of youth who identify as LGBT and has taken a very strong pro-migration stance. Therefore, he may have been promoted by Francis to spite president Trump. Yet, he has also taken a strong stance against gender ideology, gay marriage and abortion in a way that clearly distinguishes him from prelates like McElroy. 

The conservative nuncio to Spain has served a little over five years. There have been rumors that Francis could appoint the controversial nun Lucía Caram as nuncio, in spite of her openly supporting legal abortion, gay marriage being celebrated in the Church and denying the perpetual virginity of Mary, but it’s uncertain whether he’ll go that far. Appointments of new bishops to Spain have remained slow, even though Pope Francis instituted a group of supporter bishops to ‘support the nuncio in making recommendations’.

The second obstacle to the appointment of progressive bishops has been the Dicastery of Bishops. It was led by Ratzingerian conservative Cardinal Ouellet for most of the papacy of Pope Francis. To the frustration of progressive Americans Ouellet was allowed to stay in office past the retirement age of 75. When he finally retired in early 2023, Pope Francis appointed the Peruvian bishop Robert Francis Prevost as prefect of this dicastery. Prevost was not Francis’ first choice. The well- known progressive Cupich from Chicago had been touted for years. Brazilian Archbishop and secretary of the Dicastery of Bishops, Ilson de Jesus Montanari was apparently Francis’ preferred candidate for a long time, according to insiders cited by The Pillar. Francis had named him to the second highest position in the dicastery back in 2013, but the prelate (whom Archbishop Vigano accused of being a compromised homosexual) apparently refused the offer of promotion multiple times (despite it guaranteeing the red hat). This resulted in Prevost finally being appointed, but Prevost is not known to be a progressive or radical reformer, at all. 

Furthermore, many of the retiring bishops (and cardinals) are actually aging Francis protégés, whose replacement will therefore not expand any liberal block. Cupich in the USA and Omella in Spain are currently all being kept in office passed the age of 75.

A final factor that’s a whole problem on its own for Francis, is that it is becoming increasingly hard to find progressive priests who can be appointed as bishops, as younger priests lean increasingly towards tradition.

The ultra-orthodox next generation

Young priests and seminarians are even more traditionalist leaning, in the United States, as well as across Europe. 50 % of American priests ordained since 2010 are moderately or even strongly critical of Pope Francis. From 2020 onwards this trend has only accelerated with more than 80 % of priests now identifying as either conservative or very conservative.

Most French seminarians admire Pope Benedict XVI most, out of all recent Popes, and 75 % plan to wear their cassock, castigated as a symbol of traditional clericalism. In Spain the Rector of the Barcelona seminary has expressed concern of new seminarians often being ‘reactionary’. In Australia the National Council of Priests, in its own words ‘founded in 1970 in the spirit of the Second Vatican Council, has seen its membership both age and dwindle drastically. Even in Germany, the vanguard of Neo-modernism, over 70 % of priests ordained since 2010 reject various key points of the Synodal Way project, such as a change in sexual ethics or the priesthood being marginalized. 

The generations of baby-boomer clergy to whom the Second Vatican Council was an extraordinary event is gradually fading away. With the Council losing its game-changing status, the question looms what status and what interpretation it will receive in the larger history of the Catholic Church. Ironically this is happening after we’ve just witnessed the frenzy of baby-boomers proclaiming that the Synod on Synodality would finally fulfill the vision of the Second Vatican Council. 

Will the ‘Spirit of Vatican II’ waste away with the synod

The Synod on Synodality has been a huge deal for both ecclesiastical revolutionaries and for traditionalists, a source of great hope and excitement for the former and one of dread and object of fierce criticism by the latter. Meanwhile moderates cautioned against high expectations for good and bad, assuming that it would be a lot of hot air with the process itself being the focus. Now a further implementation process with more endless listening till the end of 2028 has been announced.

Pope Francis always claimed it was about synodality itself and not about specific hot button issues, something traditionalists asserted was a smokescreen. Whether it initially was or wasn’t, it does appear that the synod ended up being only about the process itself.

The whole dynamic seems to be fizzling out. The synod was extended multiple times and now it’s basically being repeated from the beginning. Meanwhile participation amongst rank and file Catholics only dwindled as the process dragged on. Left-wing pressure groups seemed the most engaged with the process, but ended up losing patience and hope, too. 

Any momentum for reform was ironically hamstrung by Vatican centralism. The Irish bishops organized their own synodal path that was initially less openly radical then the Germans, but could give impetus to radicals in Ireland. However, Rome had the bishops postpone the project, so that the first session will only start in 2026. 

Similarly, radical reformers had hoped that they could use the Fifth Plenary Council of Australia for pushing through an agenda similar to the one in Germany, with a normalization of homosexuality and talk about the ordination of women. The Council had been called in response to pressure on the Church that resulted from the Royal Commission into child sexual abuse, that had singled out the Catholic Church for criticism (while refusing the hold public hearings on Islamic institutions).

The Covid pandemic led to it being postponed which together with the unanimous acquittal by the High Court on false child sexual abuse charges of the conservative Cardinal Pell weakened the momentum for the council; proposals on celibacy or sexual ethics ended up on the floor of the cutting room. Yet, the reformers got two to three things they wanted out of the council: a request to Rome to allow communal confession in more cases, lay preaching during mass and openness to female deacons if Rome were to approve of it.

Rome’s response was to just ignore the council and it has not confirmed the decrees for nearly two years now, even though the timeline for implementation set by the council itself required that much of it should have been pushed through by now. Synodal projects outside of Germany have come to a screeching halt. 

At the synodal assembly in October 2024 it was no longer clear what the main point of discussion would be. More reflection on reflection? Dialogue about dialogue? Communal discernment that doesn’t lead to concrete action? The main bone of contention last year was the possibility that national bishops’ conferences would be able to locally make decisions about doctrine. This was rejected by the majority of conservative bishops, in spite of clear support from Grech, Hollerich and many of the theologians appointed to the synod. The final document ended up being vague and the decision of Pope Francis to not give it any spin through a post-synodal apostolic exhortation, but instead make it a part of the ordinary magisterium that is at the same time not fully binding, made the synod end with a whimper.

The Instrumentum Laboris for the second session removed any mention to all the controversial topics from female deacons, to sexual morality and the appointment of bishops. These have been passed on to various commissions that will hopefully have a report ready in June (but with little heard so far), about which the Pope then can decide whether he does anything with it. Interim reports are supposed to be given to the final meeting, but the bishops cannot do much with them. 

The synod was seen as legacy-defining for Pope Francis and now it’s unclear what this undertaking, or much other initiatives of this pontificate, were about. The synod being extended by Grech (with Francis’ alleged approval) suggests synodality has not become entrenched and that it needs to be further promoted for it to ensure it does not quickly vanish again. Does this have implications for progressive Catholicism after Pope Francis?

The Synod on Synodality was actually taunted for quite a while by some of its fiercest advocates, as the culmination or fulfillment of the Second Vatican Council. Radicals who view synodality as a long awaited chance to finally push through revolutionary changes that were opposed by the ‘oppressive’ John Paul II and Benedict XVI. They follow the Bologna school that views the Second Vatican Council as a rupture with the past. They are intent on revising Catholic sexual morality, have a strong dislike for Humanae Vitae and some even wish to outright ignore parts of the Second Vatican Council, specifically what some of the texts actually say. The German bishops who push the Synodal Way are the most prominent example of this. 

Fight over legacy

These ‘rupturists’ represent the most radical faction of cardinals and bishops in the Church. 

There are roughly four factions with influence within the Church, figures like Vigano and Gracida being outliers. Besides the rupturists there is a faction that believes (or claims to believe in) some form of ‘hermeneutic of continuity’ and can even reference Pope Benedict XVI in that regard, but ultimately they believe in developing beyond that and the hermeneutic of continuity has past teachings continuously reinterpreted through the lens of the present instead of the reverse. 

The third school can simply be called Ratzingerian. They adhere to an organic and holistic continuity where the Second Vatican Council is neither marginalized, nor idolized. Cardinals such as Koch, Filoni, Woelki, Nycz and most American bishops clearly fall in this category. 

The fourth category is best described as semi-traditional and has Cardinal Burke and Cardinal Sarah as its most well-known supporters. The Second Vatican Council isn’t rejected, as it is by Vigano, but its dogmatic status may be downplayed or denied and various aspects of it are subjected to criticism. 

The latter two groups have been brought ever closer together during the perils of the current pontificate. The first two, on the other hand, have become far more divided, now that they don’t stand united in varying degrees of opposition to Cardinal Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI. The push of the German Synodal Path has brought these tensions further to the forefront. While both factions were willing to make at least some concessions to the Germans during the Synod on the Family, either in the name of doctrinal revolution, a more pastoral approach without changing doctrine, or even simply just by allowing national Bishops’ Conferences to dispense from (the application of) doctrine in its regional context. 

The Germans demanded more, however, and in 2019 ignored not just curial heavyweights, but Pope Francis himself, when embarking on their Synodal Path. This has caused a backlash amongst moderate bishops in general, including those in the curia, while Pope Francis himself also appears to have cooled on the Germans significantly. Ironically the Secretary of State, Cardinal Parolin, has led the increasingly hardline response from the Vatican, with the curia being less and less willing to make any concessions. 

Parolin is positioning himself as the moderate reformist, an institutionalist, ahead of the new conclave. The relator-general of the synod, Jean-Claude Hollerich from Luxemburg, has shown himself a lot more sympathetic to the Germans and their desire to loosen priestly celibacy and normalize homosexuality. Recently, the Secretary of the Synod, Mario Grech from Malta, has started to make similar overtures, even suggesting that a ‘rainbow church’ would be the solution, where Germans could reject Catholic doctrine, while African bishops uphold it. Grech is now touted as the radical papabile. 

But both Grech and Hollerich, while serving as key synod organizers, ultimately remain under the firm control of Francis, with neither one having a full time job in the curia, while Parolin as the Vatican Secretary of State has a lot more day-to-day influence and, more importantly, the support of most curial prefects, including those appointed by Pope Francis. The new prefect for the Dicastery of the Bishops, Robert Francis Prevost, took his predecessor Cardinal Ouellet’s place at Parolin’s side when talking with the Germans and pressuring them to desist from any schismatic actions. South Korean Cardinal Lazarus You Heung-sik, Francis’ pick to head the Dicastery of the Clergy opposes the loosening of priestly celibacy, and Cardinal Koch of the Dicastery for Christian Unity has been a consistent critic of the synod. 

Fernandez, similarly not Francis’ first choice to be the Prefect for the Dicastery of the Doctrine of Faith, started as somewhat of an outlier, more open to homosexuality, but less clearly in one specific camp. Initially it seemed that he could serve as a bridge towards the Germans, but the backlash around Fiducia Supplicans by over a dozen Bishops’ Conferences and dozens of cardinals largely discredited him, together with renewed scrutiny over his controversial works on erotic mysticism which have been deemed blasphemous. 

The situation is further complicated by the fact several curial prefects and cardinals, including ones appointed by him, oppose his (shifting) agenda and stances on various key issues. Whether it is Koch taking a more orthodox and theologically coherent stance on ecumenics or the new prefect for the Eastern Churches diverging from Pope Francis’ stance on Ukraine. Gugerotti’s exact position will be subject to dispute, due to his diplomatic role in Ukraine, but he actively supported the Ukrainian Catholics in rejecting Pope Francis’ ecumenical agreements with Kyrill, which they viewed as an abandonment. More importantly, now as a prefect, the Ukrainian bishops met with him after he became prefect to share their grievances regarding Pope Francis’ statements on the Russian invasion. Importantly, he kept his distance from the peace mission Pope Francis sent Cardinal Zuppi on. Zuppi is perceived as more pro-Russian.

Additionally, Pope Francis has appointed a surprisingly great number of orthodox cardinals, including strong opponents of the agenda of the Synodal Path, mainly from the peripheries. They include figures such as Goh, Arborelius, Da Silva and Ambongo Besungu. Therefore the election of a pope similar to Francis is anything but guaranteed. The fact that several supporters of the Tridentine mass and communion on the tongue, such as cardinals Bustillo and Goh, were made cardinals by Pope Francis is perfectly indicative of how problematic it is to speak of ‘Pope Francis’ cardinals’. 

There has been discussion whether the new cardinal from the Philippines, Pablo Virgilio David, is a firm conservative, but not only has he been critical of proposals to loosen celibacy during the Amazon Synod, he is currently leading the fight against the legalization of divorce in the Philippines. 
While the Chilean bishops were pressured by the Vatican under John Paul II to stand united against the legalization of divorce in their country more than twenty years ago, the bishops in the Philippines are receiving no such pressure or even clear support from the Vatican under Francis. At least one bishop has shown himself open to legalization but not our new cardinal. Additionally, he has diplomatically opposed the LGBT agenda being advanced.

Conclusion

With Pope Francis’ having moved away from his radical allies, the synod’s results limited and many in the college of cardinals having become critical of Francis, his legacy and the synod with its emphasis on Vatican II are all hanging by a thread. 

The election of a Ratzingerian or semi-traditionalist candidate as pope will likely result in Vatican II definitively losing its supreme status, yet at the same time might gave it a more stable place in the history of the Church. The election of an institutionalist reformer or of a radical will see the council continue to be the subject of constant dispute.