What Tuđman Can Teach Us About Orbán’s Future

Will Soros's anti-Westernism triumph in Hungary after Orbán’s departure as it did in Croatia after Franjo Tuđman's death?

From The European Conservative

By Matija Štahan

After Tuđman’s death, Croatian patriotic enthusiasm was very quickly exposed to scorn and stigmatization.

During his first term as prime minister of Hungary, from 1998-2002, Viktor Orbán delivered a eulogy for Franjo Tuđman, the first president of Croatia (1990-1999). In his remarks, Orbán noted that “Central Europe remains without a leader. That region cannot be as stable as it is now without President Tuđman. We need to continue on his path and build on his work.” Orbán’s words were not an empty courtesy; if anything, they were a prophecy. After he returned to power in 2010, the Western media portrayed him in the same way that they had portrayed the Croatian president: an autocratic ruler opposed to the liberal norms of the modern West.

Despite the media’s false characterization of the two, it is undeniable that there is a marked similarity in their political lives. In his day, Tuđman was a charismatic leader who prized the nation over the ‘global community.’ Like Tuđman, Orbán has been fighting for the interests of his country since he entered into politics, and despite pressure from Western powers, which deny the importance of national traditions and insist that people can be transplanted from one cultural context to another without consequences. Hence, today, the seemingly endless flow of African and Asian migrants in Europe is framed as a natural—and even a desirable—turn of events. Although migration was not an issue in Tuđman’s day, he had to fight a war against Yugoslav ‘multiculturalism’ and Serbian imperialism, which morphed into a single entity.

Their key arguments can be explained succinctly as choosing sovereignty over globalization: Orbán positioned himself against the influx of migrants. Tuđman opposed Croatia being a part of Yugoslavia or becoming the regional unit of the Western Balkans. He did not want the Croats to be dominated by the East (i.e. Belgrade) or the West.

Sovereigntist politics

The two leaders’ biographies are, of course, very different. Orbán was born after the Second World War; Tuđman participated in it. Despite this, Orbán’s life has had a very similar trajectory to Tuđman’s. Both of them had a political conversion. Tuđman began as a communist who helped build Yugoslavia, and ended as a Croatian nationalist who overthrew it. Orbán began his political career as a liberal and the recipient of donations from George Soros; he is now known as the founder of an ‘illiberal democracy’ and is one of the loudest critics of Soros’ financial and political activities. In the Second World War, Tuđman fought on the side of Tito’s partisans and later became the youngest Yugoslav general. He left the army to do historiography and fell out of favor with the communist authorities by questioning the foundational Yugoslav myths about the collective guilt of the Croatian people for WWII war crimes. In the 1960s, he was expelled from the Communist Party, and in the ’70s and ’80s, he was temporarily imprisoned for speaking out about Croatian inequality in Yugoslavia.

As a forerunner of contemporary sovereigntist movements on the European Right, Tuđman was guided by a clear principle: Croatia can cooperate with other countries—in fact, Zagreb’s goal was to join the Euro-Atlantic integrations—but it is completely unacceptable for other countries to dictate Croatia’s policy. Orbán is guided by a similar principle. Hungary will remain a member of the EU, but a member that is independent of the will of European bureaucrats who seek to impose ideological experiments on the Hungarian people.

Resisting Soros and Western NGOs

In contrast to globalist and multicultural values, Tuđman committed his nation to upholding traditional values and the ethical heritage of Christianity. He would not agree to the ideologies imposed on Croatia, despite the powerful political activities of foreign financiers and NGOs, especially in transitional post-communist countries. George Soros and his Open Society Foundation are prominent examples of organizations that seek to undermine national character and culture.

In a speech delivered to the members of his party in late 1996, Tuđman talked about the “new illusionists” who were advocating “internationalism,” and he argued that Soros’ Open Society, the Helsinki Committee, and other human rights organizations were the same actors who preached “Yugoslavism” and “Pan-Slavism.” Tuđman claimed that their goal, through infiltration into “the media, science, culture, environmental protection, healthcare, [and] education” was to “de-Croatize Croatian culture, Croatian politics, and the Croatian state.” Such “creation of a state within a state,” he noted, “is not compatible with diplomatic codes and state sovereignty.” Similarly, Orbán recognizes and fights back against Soros’ war on the Hungarian state, social values, and ultimately the democratic order. 

Earlier in 1996, a mass protest broke out in Zagreb. It was sparked by the cancellation of the concession (eventually withdrawn) of a popular alternative radio station which criticized the government and was financed by Western NGOs. In a famous speech given two days, Tuđman harshly criticized “false preachers and pseudo-democratic deceivers” who “preach big ideas about human rights and media freedoms” in order to undermine “Croatian freedom and independence.” At the end of the speech, which was widely regarded as an attack on Soros and his allies in Croatia—and which was pointed to as proof of Tuđman’s authoritarianism—the Croatian president concluded: “Croatia will not be anyone’s colony.”

Tuđman followed through on that promise, although his actions were not as comprehensive as Orbán’s have been. While Orbán’s Hungary has entered into an open conflict with Soros—for example, the Central European University, of which Soros is a founder, was expelled from Budapest—Croatia only leveled accusations against certain officials of the Open Society for financial malfeasance (these accusations were also criticized in media such as the New York Times).

Despite the subversive actions of NGOs financed by Soros and the embassies of certain Western countries, Tuđman experienced overwhelming victories in all of the elections of the 1990s; moreover, he usually won with a more convincing majority of the popular vote than Orbán. And yet, after only a very short time following his death, everything had changed.

Although he failed to remove Tuđman from power, Soros nevertheless symbolically won in Croatia. The changes for which Soros advocated were required by the cultural and political trends of the West, which were also connected to Croatia’s approach to Euro-Atlantic integration. Paradoxically, even Tuđman himself is largely to blame for Soros’ symbolic victory. This is because, in order to win and retain power, and perhaps as a way to defend his own communist past, Tuđman did not initiate a clear break with the Yugoslav communist elites, but rather allowed many influential communist politicians to retain their power in independent Croatia. After his death, that decision undermined his legacy. The former communists merged their Yugoslav “multiculturalism” with the current, globalist regime.

De-Tuđmanization and de-Orbánization?

Tuđman’s successors, often unrepentant former communists, engaged in numerous compromises with power centers outside Croatia. Sometimes these negotiations bordered on high treason—as in the case of the handing over of classified documents from Tuđman’s office to the Hague Tribunal during the mandate of his successor Stjepan Mesić. Croatian telecommunications, banks, the food industry, and the media (even the state oil company, the majority of which was sold to Hungary) were largely left to foreigners. This had less to do with ‘market laws’ and more to do with the strategic positioning of foreign political and economic interests in Croatia and the servile policies of Tuđman’s successors. The postulates of globalism were woven into Croatian media, politics, and culture. After Tuđman’s death, communist myths were resurrected, and the feeling of patriotic enthusiasm in the people inspired by the war of independence was very quickly exposed to media scorn and stigmatization. In short, Croatia’s political parties, including the post-Tuđman HDZ, have undergone a ‘de-Tuđmanization.’

In light of these historical events, it is important to recognize that, after Orbán steps down from power, Hungary could pass through a similar ‘de-Orbánization.’ This could happen if globalist actors use Orbán’s shortcomings—which are similar to Tuđman’s and are largely conditioned by the contextual similarity of their ruling positions. These shortcomings were not the main cause of ‘de-Tuđmanization,’ nor would they be of the potential ‘de-Orbánization.’ However, they provide an excuse for the implementation of policies crafted by foreign power centers, which political opposition will embrace as a means of seizing power themselves. 

One of these easily exploited shortcomings is that, like Tuđman, Orbán has created a circle of politicians and entrepreneurs who have become co-managers of the state. Like his Croatian predecessor, the Hungarian prime minister has created a system that depends too much on one person. These systems often fall apart after the dispossession or death of a charismatic leader.

To this must be added the occasional use of legal but ethically dubious methods of maintaining power, which are mostly criticized by the emissaries of Western democracies and the mainstream media. Of course, those critics regularly gloss over the counter-question: if one side does not play by the liberal and democratic rules, is this not a legitimate way for the other side to fight back? Bearing in mind that both Soros and the Western powers routinely manipulate democracy in order to achieve their interests, such criticism is hypocritical.

Cultural hegemony

Realizing that the conquest and retention of power mainly boils down to the establishment of what Antonio Gramsci called “cultural hegemony,” Orbán came to the same conclusions as Tuđman and began building a parallel intellectual and cultural nucleus that promotes sovereignist thought. He has facilitated this through boosting sympathetic media platforms, but also by supporting new universities (e.g. the Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Budapest) and think tanks (e.g. the Danube Institute), which lends intellectual credibility to conservatism. There are examples in recent history of well-known intellectual figures supporting the vision of Eastern European regimes. Czechia had an advocate in Roger Scruton, who personally helped dissidents during communism. Alain Finkielkraut was not fooled by communist myths about “fascist Croats,” and he unequivocally sided with Croatia during the Croatian-Serbian war. Orbán has among his advocates influential intellectuals such as Rod Dreher, Gladden Pappin, John O’Sullivan, and to some extent Jordan Peterson and Patrick Deneen.

The problem with the establishment of cultural hegemony in a small country is that, in a globalized world, it cannot be achieved without help from a powerful foreign ally. Tuđman did not succeed in his goal; Orbán has accomplished more in this realm. This is because while Tuđman gave interviews for the world’s most respected newspapers such as Der Spiegel or Liberation, Orbán has become the global star of a lively conservatism. Social media has only helped fuel this fame. If Tuđman had been able to reach a global audience, then he could have given a masterclass in debunking the soft hegemony of the liberal order. 

As it is, Orbán is left to speak at prominent events like the 2022 CPAC conference in Dallas, where he called worldwide conservatives to join him, declaring, “I’m here to tell you that we should unite our forces.” In that same speech, he accused progressive liberals of being the same as communists; indeed, Croatia’s history shows that they are often the same people. Consequently, Orbán has sought to turn his national fight against globalism into a global fight against globalism:

We must take back the institutions in Washington and in Brussels. We must find friends and allies in one another. We must coordinate the movement of our troops, because we face the same challenge. You have midterm elections this year, then presidential and congressional elections in ’24, and we will have elections in the European parliament the same year. These two locations will define the two fronts in the battle being fought for Western civilization. Today we hold neither of them, yet we need both.

By describing the modus operandi of his political rivals, Orbán explicitly identifies the hypocrisy of invoking the rules of liberalism. In this way, he implicitly points to the post-liberal reality of contemporary politics, which have led him to conclude that we are in a clash between two cultural hegemonies: 

We cannot fight successfully by liberal means, because our opponents use liberal institutions, concepts, and language to disguise their Marxist and hegemonist plans. Politics, my friends, are not enough. This war is a culture war.

Setting aside the superficial use of the term Marxist, Orbán’s statement demonstrates his awareness of three things: First, that his politics cannot survive without a global ideological change; second, that the rules of the battle have never been determined by the norms of liberal democracy; and third, that the primary crisis is not political, but cultural. 

Orbán and Tuđman became national leaders at times when a nationalist could win elections almost exclusively because of personal charisma. But unlike Tuđman, Orbán’s rule is situated in the broader political context, allowing for the possibility of the kind of global change that could preserve his own political legacy in Hungary. After all, unexpected reversals are possible in several directions. On the one hand, the recent Polish elections, with the pressure of the EU political establishment for a change of government, confirms that even strong conservative governments can be voted out. Without changing the global order, the new Hungarian law on the prohibition of party financing with funds outside Hungary may postpone such a fate, but not prevent it. On the other hand, developments such as the victory of the Eurosceptic political option in the Netherlands show that a change in the wider Western framework in favor of sovereigntist policies is still possible.

The epoch of liberal hegemony—which lasted from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to Putin’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022—is coming to an end. Globalism has begun to collapse with China and Russia’s deliberate self-exclusion from Western politics, and now everything—including Orbán’s vision of the re-traditionalization of the West—is a little more possible than it was yesterday.

If this global shift is not achieved, then no matter how indestructible Orbán’s values seem to be in Hungary, his removal from power will be effected by the  type of cultural hegemony against which he fought, symbolized by Soros, NGOs, mainstream media, and political ideologies sponsored by the U.S. and the EU. The lesson we must learn is that only  a complete political change outside of a specific country in a globalised West can ensure that its conservative politics will endure.