In the Appointment of New Chinese Bishops, Beijing Clobbers Rome. The Case of Fujian

The 'deal' Pervert McCarrick helped negotiate bears fruit, and it's not good fruit!

From L'Espresso

By Sandro Magister

The “poor Uyghurs” Pope Francis has included for the first time among the persecuted - in a passage of his latest book to be released on December 1 in several languages ​​- have in recent days dominated the news regarding relations between the Vatican and China.

In effect, the immediate, polemical reaction of the Chinese government - which rejected the pope's accusation as “without a basis in the facts,” given “the full rights of existence, development, and freedom of religious belief enjoyed by all ethnic groups” in China - has exposed the realpolitikal reasons for such a prolonged silence on the part of both Francis and the higher-ups of the Church on one of the most blatant and systematic forms of religious persecutions taking place in China; a silence broken only, up to now, by the isolated denunciations of cardinals Joseph Zen Zekiun, bishop emeritus of Hong Kong, and Charles Maung Bo, archbishop of Yangon.

But the uproar over the question of the Uyghur Muslims has obscured another important news item: the first appointment of a Catholic bishop made in keeping with the secret accord signed by the Holy See and China on September 22 2018 and extended last month for another two years.

The new bishop is Thomas Chen Tianhao, 58, and he has been placed at the helm of the diocese of Qingdao, in the rich coastal province of Shandong.

The diocese had been vacant since June of 2018, after the death aged 94 of his predecessor, Joseph Li Mingshu, recognized by both the Holy See and the Beijing authorities but clearly pliant above all to the latter and in particular to the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, the most pervasive tool for the supervision of the Catholic Church in China, whose supreme head was for decades Anthony Liu Bainian, also of Shandong.

The consecration of the new bishop took place on November 23 at the cathedral of Qingdao. It was presided over by Linyi bishop John Fang Xingyao, who is also president of the Patriotic Association and vice-president of the council of bishops, a false simulacrum of an episcopal conference that brings together only the bishops recognized by the regime and that is entitled - under the secret accord, as far as one can guess - to select and propose each new bishop to the pope, following a rigged “election” in the respective diocese by representatives of the clergy, religious, and laity incorporated into the regime.

In confirmation of this, the Asia News agency of the Pontifical Institute for Foreign Missions noted that in the formula for the consecration of the new bishop of Qingdao “the mandate of the council of bishops was mentioned, but nothing was said about the pope and the Hole See.” His prior “election” is thought to have taken place on November 19, 2019.

Like his predecessor if not even more so, the new bishop Chen is also a man of the regime, a longstanding official both local and national of the Patriotic Association, whose high-ranking members were present in good numbers at the ordination.

In the 2007 letter from Benedict XVI to the Church of China - still valid as his “magna carta” - it is written that “ the declared purpose [of the Patriotic Association] to implement ‘the principles of independence and autonomy, self-management and democratic administration of the Church’ is incompatible with Catholic doctrine.”

But the practical instructions given by Rome to the Chinese clergy and bishops on June 28 2019 have widened the discretionary space for membership in the Patriotic Association, insistently requested by the regime.

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Getting back to the 2018 agreement on the appointment of bishops, it must be acknowledged to its credit that it put an end to the unilateral appointments previously made by the Chinese government alone, without any consent from Rome, with the consequent excommunications of those appointed.

But the high number of vacant dioceses has remained practically unchanged. Those currently governed by a bishop are 74, much fewer, therefore, than the 135 dioceses and apostolic prefectures of the whole of China, not counting Hong Kong and Macao, and much fewer also than the 104 dioceses unilaterally redesigned and consolidated by the government without the approval of Rome.

On November 24, the Vatican press office announced that “other episcopal consecrations are expected because various processes for new episcopal appointments are underway.”

But filling the voids will be far from easy, because each diocese in China is a case in itself that requires specific solutions, as shown by an interesting essay published on November 16 on UCA News by the French anthropologist and theologian Michel Chambon:

> Does China really need more bishops?

One exemplary case study for understanding how complicated things are is presented by Fujian, the coastal province across from the island of Taiwan.

According to the Vatican mapping there are four dioceses and two apostolic prefectures in Fujian: along the coast, starting from the north, the diocese of Xiapu-Mindong, the archdiocese of Fuzhou, and the diocese of Xiamen, and in the interior the diocese of Changting and the prefectures of Jian'ou and Shaowu.

According to the government mapping, however, the diocese of Changting is included in that of Xiamen, and the two apostolic prefectures are merged into a new diocese, that of Minbei.

So then, keeping to this second mapping, by which in practice even the Vatican abides, the state of affairs is as follows.

In the diocese of Xiapu-Mindong, before the 2018 accord most of the faithful and clergy were underground, meaning without government recognition, and were led by a bishop who was also underground, recognized only by Rome, Vincent Guo Xiijin. But there was also a small minority of official Catholics, led by a bishop unilaterally installed by the Chinese government and hit with excommunication, Vincent Zhan Silu.

With the accord, Rome dropped the excommunication and installed Zhan as titular of the diocese, relegating Guo to being his auxiliary. Guo accepted, but refused to join, as requested by the regime, that “independent Church” which for him and for his faithful is still  considered “irreconcilable” with the Catholic faith. Subjected to increasing retaliation for this, up to expulsion from his home and complete loss of freedom, to complete silence from the Holy See, he ended up resigning from all his public roles right on the brink of the renewal of the accord. It is easy to understand that the conflict between official and underground in the diocese of Xiapu-Mindong continues to be bitter.

In the archdiocese of Fuzhou instead, one of the most populous in China, with 300,000 faithful, 120 priests and 500 nuns, the contrast is among the underground themselves and has a long history. Before the 2018 accord part of the clergy and faithful sided with the bishop installed by Rome, Peter Lin Jiashan, while a larger and more combative part distrusted him, considering him too recalcitrant to submit to the regime. To mend the conflict, between 2007 and 2016 Rome had even suspended Lin, replacing him with an apostolic administrator. But in vain.

In fact, when on June 9 2020 Lin, 86, obtained the longed-for government recognition and signed up for membership in the “independent Church,” many in the diocese felt betrayed by both him and the Vatican. And the conflict is now deeper than ever.

By comparison, the little diocese of Xiamen appears to be an oasis of tranquility, run as it is by a bishop who has long been recognized by both Rome and Beijing and peacefully accepted by the faithful, Joseph Cai Bingrui, 54.

The diocese of Minbei, however, has been without a bishop for decades and will probably stay that way for quite a while. It covers a mountainous rural area, almost half the size of the province of Fujian. The Catholic communities are small and scattered, without their own clergy, cared for by priests from elsewhere.

One of these priests, for many years the most active, comes from the neighboring diocese of Xiapu-Mindong and more precisely from the circle of the enterprising formerly excommunicated bishop who now runs it. In fact, this priest is already acting as administrator of the vacant diocese of Minbei. But if he becomes its bishop it is expected that he will meet with strong opposition from the faithful, precisely because of his ties to the formerly excommunicated bishop, hard beset in his own diocese of Xiapu-Mindong.

Furthermore, the Catholics of this territory demonstrate that another reason to go without a bishop - and so be less institutionalized - is to undergo less scrutiny by the Chinese authorities. They apply to themselves the saying, “The first bird to bob up will get shot.” Better to keep a low profile, without a bishop, all the more so if he is part of the the regime, than to suffer heavier repression than one already does.

In short, four dioceses with four very different situations. Fujian is a perfect portrait of how complicated the structure of the Chinese Church is.